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Abstract 
The number of intrusions into organization IT environments has been increasing over the 
years. Detecting intrusions remains a difficult task as the long average adversary dwell 
times indicate. Organizations struggle with increasing complexity as they expand their IT 
environments into cloud and deal with a growing number of endpoints due to IoT. 
This thesis introduces a kill chain based approach for detecting cyber intrusions. In this 
approach, events are mapped into well-known adversary techniques and tactic categories. 
After the event to adversary technique associations has been identified, data analysis 
methods are applied to connect the events together to form the intrusion kill chain. 
A proof of concept implementation was used to demonstrate the viability of the approach. 
The implementation was constructed in a closed test environment using free and open 
source tools. A simulated intrusion scenario was used to demonstrate the use of the 
approach in action, as well as to produce an interactive visualization of the intrusion kill 
chain. 
The result of the implementation demonstrates that constructing an intrusion kill chain 
based on event data is viable; however, certain conditions have to be taken into 
consideration. The quality of the event data and accuracy of the event to technique 
mapping affects the number of false positive adversary technique detections. Choosing the 
right fields for connecting events together is crucial, as it impacts on coverage of the 
resulting graph of the kill chain. A graph of a kill chain is not in itself hugely valuable 
without a proper visualization that highlights anomalies, and which users can use to get 
more details about the events. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Organisaatioiden IT ympäristöihin kohdistuneet tietomurrot ovat kasvaneet viime vuosina. 
Tietomurtojen havaitseminen on edelleen haasteellista, kuten pitkät viiveet 
tunkeutumisen ja havaitsemisen välillä osoittavat. Organisaatiot kamppailevat alati 
kasvavan kompleksisuuden kanssa laajentaessaan palvelujaan pilveen ja päätelaitteiden 
määrän kasvaessa IoT:n myötä. 
Opinnäytetyö esittelee kill chain –pohjaisen lähestymistavan tietomurtojen 
havaitsemiseen. Tässä lähestymistavassa ympäristön tapahtumat liitetään tunnettuihin 
uhkatoimijoiden käyttämiin tekniikoihin ja taktiikkaluokkiin. Kun uhkatoimijoiden 
tekniikoihin liittyvät tapahtumat on tunnistettu, tapahtumat yhdistetään toisiinsa data-
analyysi menetelmiä käyttäen, jolloin niistä muodostuu tietomurron tapahtumien kulkua 
kuvaava kill chain. 
Lähestymistavan toimivuus todennettiin esimerkkitoteutuksella. Toteutus suoritettiin 
suljetussa testiympäristössä käyttäen ilmaisia, avoimen lähdekoodin työkaluja. 
Ympäristössä simuloitiin tietomurtoskenaario, jonka pohjalta luotiin kill chain –graafi sekä 
interaktiivinen visualisaatio. 
Toteutuksen tulokset osoittavat, että kill chain muodostaminen tapahtumadatasta on 
mahdollista tietyt ehdot huomioon ottaen. Tapahtumadatan laatu sekä tapahtuma-
tekniikka-liitosten tarkkuus vaikuttaa menetelmän tuottamien väärien havaintojen 
määrään. Tapahtumien yhdistämiseen käytettävien kenttien oikea valinta on ratkaisevaa, 
koska se vaikuttaa suoraan kill chain –graafin kattavuuteen. Graafi itsessään ei ole erityisen 
hyödyllinen ilman visualisaatiota, joka nostaa esiin poikkeamia ja jonka avulla käyttäjät 
voivat tarkastella yksittäisten tapahtumien tietoja. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Digitalization has been accelerating over the last few years at an increasing pace. 
Increasing number of companies and agencies are starting to offer their services 
primarily in a digital form. This evolution has enabled businesses to better serve their 
customers and provided new level of convenience for consumers. It is however, 
increased user’s reliance on digital systems both as an individual and society level. 
The IT landscape itself is changing and growing more complex. Organizations used to 
host all the internal and external services on their own premises. Today, most of 
them are moving to cloud services for flexibility and scalability reasons, while 
keeping some systems internal for security and compliance reasons (Shackleford 
2017, 1-2). The number of endpoints is also growing due to rise of IoT devices. 
Organizations often do not manage or have control over these third party provided 
services and devices that have connections to internal systems. This creates reliance 
on external third-party vendors, which presents adversaries new opportunities for 
breaching the organization (Aon 2019). 
At the same time, defending against adversaries remains difficult for organizations. 
According to FireEye’s M-Trends report, average dwell time in 2018 was 78 days 
(FireEye 2019). One factor contributing to this is the complexity and noise of the 
target environment (Storm, Battaglia, Kemmerer, Miller, Wampler, Whitley & Wolf 
2017, 1). Another factor is that organizations don’t have the necessary resources 
such as technology, talent or time to counter the threats (Cisco 2018). Meanwhile 
the adversaries are getting more sophisticated on evading defenses and taking 
advantage of legitimate services for remaining hidden (Cisco 2018). 
Organizations have traditionally relied on reactive approach on countering cyber 
security threats. This approach includes activities such as reacting to alerts from SIEM 
system or responding to incidents reported by users. Over the last few years, a new 
approach called threat hunting has emerged. Threat hunting is a more proactive and 
human-driven approach compared to the traditional passive and reactive approach 
(Lee & Lee 2018, 2). 
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The rise of advanced persistent threats (APT) presented by well-resourced and 
trained adversaries requires more threat driven approach with a focus on adversary 
behavior. Important aspect of this this threat driven approach is to be able to map 
the adversary actions and behaviors into distinct stages of the cyber-attack lifecycle. 
Lockheed Martin described this lifecycle as intrusion kill chain. (Hutchins, Cloppert & 
Amin, 2010) 
1.2 Goal of thesis 
The goal of this thesis is to develop method for mapping the adversary techniques 
into different stages of the cyber kill chain and to be able to connect them to form 
complete cyber-attack lifecycle. The thesis focuses on identifying the techniques 
used by adversaries by analyzing event data collected from endpoints and visualizing 
the kill chain based on the processed data. End goal is to produce a model that can 
be utilized in both small or large IT environments as well as part of training or cyber 
security exercises organized by JYVSECTEC. JYVSECTEC is an independent security 
research, development, and training center operating as part of JAMK University of 
Applied Sciences’ Institute of Information Technology. The results of the thesis will 
also be used as part of CYBERDI project, which is a joint project of JAMK and Police 
University College to strengthen the competence to detect and investigate 
cybercrime, as well as to become profiled as competent cybercrime research experts 
(JYVSECTEC 2018). 
1.3 Structure of thesis 
The second chapter describes the research problem, question and method of the 
thesis. The third chapter contains theoretical background of threat hunting, attack 
lifecycle frameworks and graph theory that the thesis research bases on. The fourth 
chapter discusses the implementation of the test environment, research material 
collection and implementation of intervention. The fifth chapter includes data 
analysis based on data collected from simulated intrusion scenario and visualization 
of the resulting intrusion kill chain. The sixth chapter includes conclusions, 
deliberation about overall process of the thesis and validity of the results, as well as 
ideas for further research. 
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2 Research design 
2.1 Research problem 
Advanced persistent threats have evolved over the years to take advantage of 
sophisticated evasion methods, such as fileless or living on the land techniques. 
These techniques are hard to detect by traditional signature-based antivirus or 
endpoint protection products since they leave very little artifacts on the target 
machine or utilize legitimate system tools. 
Modern operating systems capture vast amount of data about events happening on 
the system, such as process creation, network activity and file access. While it is 
possible for an adversary to avoid detection by security products, it is almost 
impossible to avoid leaving any traces on these event records. The problem is how to 
detect the malicious activity from normal user or system activity when a typical 
system can generate hundreds of events per minute. 
Individual events, such as running of scheduled task does not necessarily indicate a 
malicious activity. Scheduling tasks is used frequently for legitimate administrative 
tasks; however, it could also be used by an adversary for persistence or lateral 
movement. Distinguishing a legitimate use from malicious use by looking at the 
individual event is challenging. The individual techniques performed by adversary do 
not; however occur a in vacuum but follow a sequence of events. By linking the 
individual events together, a more accurate case for whether or not a set of events 
constitutes malicious activity can be built. (Storm, et al. 2017, 12) 
Mapping events further into different stages of the attack lifecycle and determining 
the kill chain helps with determining the motives and goals of the adversary. The 
information can also be used for finding weaknesses in defenses, prioritizing 
resources and developing better detection methods. The main problem this thesis 
focuses on is how to map the events into adversary techniques, attack lifecycle 
stages and how to link the events together. 
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2.2 Research question 
The main question this thesis aims to answer is:  
 Is it possible to identify and link stages of cyber kill chain by collecting and analyzing 
event data? 
 
To answer this question, event data must first be collected from target systems for 
analysis. Next, the individual techniques used by adversaries must be identified and 
mapped to specific events. Finally, the events must be linked together using data 
analysis methods to form the kill chain and visualize it for users. 
2.3 Research method 
The research method chosen for this thesis is design research. Design research is not 
a separate research method itself, but a combination of the two main research 
approaches: qualitative and quantitative. The main difference to traditional research 
approach is that instead of just analyzing and presenting solution to a problem, 
design research aims to eliminate the problem. Design research can be thought to 
start where the traditional research ends. (Kananen 2015, 39-40) 
Design research contains three distinct phases are repeated in a cycle: planning, 
implementation and evaluation. The planning phase includes assessing necessity and 
financial viability of the change process: gains from the change must outweigh the 
costs. The implementation phase includes selecting an appropriate intervention, 
material collection and evaluation methods, as well as the implementation of the 
intervention. Intervention is a concrete action or actions which lead from an initial 
state to the desired state. Verification of intervention results requires setting 
measurable goals and metrics. Material collection produces the required information 
needed in different phases of the research. It provides a base for evaluation of the 
results. Material collection methods can include traditional qualitative or 
quantitative methods. The evaluation phase is used to evaluate the impact of the 
intervention based on the goals and metrics. It is also important to monitor the 
intervention process itself to understand how the result was originated. (Kananen 
2015, 50-58) 
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Several models for measuring the research results exist. The most common is the 
before and after model where measurement is done before and after the 
intervention. The difference of the measurements describes the magnitude of 
change but does not indicate how much impact the intervention had on the result. 
Before and after measurement can also be done with a control group. This model 
gives more reliable results as the external influences can be eliminated when 
comparing results of the two groups. The measurement can also be performed only 
after the intervention. It is easier to implement than the before and after model; 
however, it has weak reliability as there is no initial measurement to compare the 
gained results to. (Kananen 2015, 61-63) 
The evaluation of validity and reliability is an important part of any research. Validity 
is used to evaluate that the research was done correctly and right aspects were 
measured. Reliability means that the results are consistent so that if the research is 
repeated, the results are the same. Validity and reliability methods depend on the 
chosen research approach. (Kananen 2015, 111-112) 
The reason design research was chosen as the research method for this thesis was 
because of the goal of the thesis in general. The goal is not just to analyze the 
problem but to develop, test and validate a solution that solves the problem and that 
can be deployed in real environments, which is exactly the goal of design research. 
According to Kananen (Kananen 2015, 76), qualitative research material collection 
can be divided into secondary and primary methods. Primary material is collected 
specially for the research purpose using observation, interview or polling methods. 
Secondary material is composed of documents related to the research subject. The 
MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base was used as a secondary material for the thesis. The 
knowledge base contains information about adversary tactics and techniques that 
can be used as a base for primary material collection. 
Observation which is part of the qualitative research approach was chosen as a 
primary material collection method. Observation can have many different forms, 
such as technical observation, covert observation and participant observation. 
Observation can be implemented in a structured or unstructured manner. In 
structured observation, the variables on which to concentrate are defined in 
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advance, whereas unstructured observation is more free-form and requires more 
documentation to understand the phenomenon. In order to meet the requirements 
for scientific research, the observation period must be defined and the observations 
documented into an observation diary. (Kananen 2015, 78-79) 
Despite being subjective, the author of the thesis feels that the observation method 
is appropriate since the results of change cannot be easily mathematically measured 
by quantitative methods and other qualitative methods such as interviews or polls 
would be difficult to arrange within desired timetable. The form of observation used 
in the thesis can be described as participant observation since the researcher actively 
participates in the collection process. The observation is to be implemented in a 
structured manner because the observed variables can be derived from secondary 
material. The author decided to measure the results using the only after intervention 
measurement. The reason for this is that there is not really anything measurable 
before implementing the intervention methods. 
Once the material has been collected, it has to be analyzed. As the material is event 
data in structured form, mathematical formulas can be used to analyze the data to 
find the connection between events. 
3 Theory 
3.1 Threat hunting 
According to SANS Institute (Lee & Lee 2018, 2), threat hunting is a focused and 
iterative approach to searching out, identifying and understanding adversaries who 
have entered the defender’s networks. A cyber security company Sqrrl that focuses 
on threat hunting defines the term as human-driven, proactive and iterative search 
through networks, endpoints, or datasets in order to detect malicious, suspicious, or 
risky activities that have evaded detection by existing automated tools (Sqrrl n.d., 4). 
A few key points can be picket from these definitions. The first point is that threat 
hunting focuses on adversaries who have already penetrated the organization and 
have access to systems, rather than focusing on preventing the initial compromise. 
The key is to detect the adversary behavior rather than prevent it. The second point 
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is that threat hunting is a human driven activity and cannot be fully automated. 
Hunting requires familiarity with the environment, ability to detect small anomalies 
and adaptation to adversary’s changing behavior. Only a human being can effectively 
accomplish these. That said, automation is an important factor on enhancing the 
scale, speed, accuracy and effectiveness of the hunting activity. The third point is 
that hunting is not just one-time event but an iterative process. Results from a hunt 
should be analyzed and used to improve the process and update the hypothesis. 
The rise of threat hunting is largely due to a change in the threat landscape. APT 
actors can defeat traditional security controls and use advanced techniques to avert 
detection and maintain long-term operations against targets. Threat hunting tries to 
combat these threats by taking an active approach. Instead of just responding to 
alerts or indicators of compromise (IOCs), threat hunting involves active searching for 
threats to prevent or minimize damage. (Lee & Lee 2019, 2) 
3.1.1 Threat hunting process 
For threat hunting to be effective, it is important to have a formal process on how 
the hunting takes place. A well-defined process makes hunting more repeatable and 
produces measurable results. One example of threat hunting process illustrated in 
Figure 1 is the hunting loop created by the Sqrrl company, which consists of four 
stages that define an effective hunting approach (Sqrll 2018, 5). 
 
Figure 1. Threat hunting loop (Sqrll 2018, 6) 
14 
 
 
Before starting the hunting process, it is useful to select one of the attack life cycle 
frameworks that breaks down the phases of a cyber kill chain and the techniques 
used by the adversaries. The framework can provide insight for each phase of the 
hunting process, from hypothesis to analytics. The best known frameworks include 
Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain, Mandiant’s Attacker Lifecycle Model and MITRE 
Adversarial Tactics, Techniques and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK) framework. (Kerr 
& Ewing 2018, 11) 
Threat hunting starts with defining a hypothesis. Hypothesis is an idea or explanation 
for something that is based on known facts but has not yet been proved (Cambridge 
Dictionary 2019). In the context of threat hunting this basically means creating a 
testable idea about what threats might be in the environment and how to go about 
finding them. Two key components for generating a hypothesis are observations and 
testability. Observations are indicators from which the hypothesis is derived. They 
can originate from internal knowledge, such as understanding of the environment or 
from previous experiences. Observations may also come from external sources, such 
as news, reports or threat intelligence feeds. Hypothesis must be something that can 
be tested. Testing the hypothesis requires having the right data, tools and techniques 
that can simultaneously take advantage of information from the environment as well 
as about likely adversaries. (Lee & Bianco 2019, 1) 
Three common types of sources where hypothesis can be derived are intelligence, 
situational awareness and domain expertise. Intelligence is usable knowledge 
generated from information (Lee & Bianco 2019, 2). In the realm of cyber security, 
this information consists mainly of IOCs and adversary tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TTPs). There are many freely available threat feeds today that provide 
information, such as IP-addresses, domain names, URLs or MD5 hashes of malware, 
that can be used as IOCs. While the IOCs themselves may not be enough to generate 
a hypothesis, investigating them can spark questions about the target, techniques 
and sophistication of the adversary. It is also important to note to which part of the 
kill chain, for example reconnaissance or command and control, the IOCs are related 
as it will impact the hypothesis. IOCs can lead to quick discoveries; yet, instead of 
only relying on them, threat hunters should use them as a starting point and try to 
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refine and contextualize the threat intelligence to stimulate a hypothesis. (Lee & 
Bianco 2019, 3) 
Situational awareness is the ability to detect changes and anomalies in the target 
environment. Situational awareness requires visibility into and understanding of the 
organization’s IT environment and the individual elements. Having situational 
awareness enables threat hunters to focus on the most important assets of the 
organization and to create hypotheses about the type of adversary activity that could 
occur in their environments. One method for identifying most important assets is the 
Crown Jewels Analysis (CJA). CJA is a process for identifying those cyber assets that 
are most critical to the accomplishment of an organization’s mission (MITRE). This 
kind of analysis can help to prioritize what kind of data is needed and where to 
collect it. People, processes and business resources should also be considered when 
building awareness. (Lee & Bianco 2019, 4-5) 
The third source for hypothesis is domain expertise. The domain expertise is a 
combination of skills, experience and background of the hunters. Threat hunters 
often have prior experience on various areas of IT, such as networking, system 
administration or data analysis, that should be leveraged on formation of the 
hypothesis. In addition to domain expertise, previous hunting experiences and 
engagements with adversaries can influence the hypothesis. While previous 
experience is valuable, it can also lead to unwanted bias. The threat hunter should be 
aware of biases and other bad analytic habits that might influence them to prejudge 
a situation. (Lee & Bianco 2019, 6-7) 
The second phase of threat hunting process is the investigation. In this phase, the 
hunters look for evidence that could prove or disprove the hypothesis (Lee & Bianco 
2019, 14). The key areas to focus on is the kind of data available for searching and 
how to sort through it. Data is crucial for threat hunting to be successful. No amount 
of skilled personnel or expensive tools can make up for the lack of data gathered 
from the environment. Examples of such data are event logs of endpoints, flow 
records, packet captures and memory dumps. An analyst should not only consider 
the quantity of the data, but also that the right data is collected and focus on quality 
of the data. Raw data should be parsed, normalized and enriched to provide 
maximum value. Analysts should also have tools to search and visualize the data to 
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help them answer questions and pinpoint anomalies across large data sets. (Lee & 
Lee 2019, 6) 
The third phase is uncovering behavior patterns and adversary TTPs from the 
collected data. This phase describes how the evidence can be reduced, grouped, and 
analyzed to reach a conclusion (Lee & Bianco 2019, 14). Data analysis methods, such 
as stack counting, clustering and grouping, can be used to discover patterns in the 
data. Linked data analysis and visualization can link together individual events to 
reconstruct complex attack paths. (Sqrll 2018, 6-7). 
The last phase of the threat hunting loop is informing and enriching automated 
analytics based on the results of the hunt. This reduces the amount of manual work 
hunters have to do in the future and frees them to focus on developing new hunts. 
Examples of how automation can be implemented include: creating searches that 
run automatically, developing playbooks or providing feedback to a supervised 
machine learning algorithm. (Sqrll 2018, 7) 
The results of the hunt can also be used to reduce the volume of the collected data 
by filtering out normal or irrelevant events and to improve active defenses by 
updating IPS or SIEM rules. Another important aspect to remember is 
documentation. Many of the findings and conclusions can be lost if not documented 
during the hunting process. Good documentation supports future hunts and helps 
training new members of the hunting team. (Kerr & Ewing 2018, 15-16) 
3.1.2 Measuring threat hunting 
Measuring threat hunting success is important for the hunting team in order to know 
what aspects to improve and to show that hunting produces value for the 
organization. Many types of metrics can be used to measure hunts. One simple 
metric is whether the hypothesis was confirmed or not. The hypothesis has to be 
sufficiently detailed so that the analysts running the hunt can prove or disprove it. If 
the hypothesis is too vague, the hunt will not produce useful results. (Kerr & Ewing 
2018, 18) 
A commonly used metric to measure hunts is the number of findings. These findings 
can be number, severity and dwell time of incidents, the number of compromised 
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hosts, discovered security vulnerabilities or new adversary TTPs discovered. The issue 
with these metrics is that not every hunt is going to produce measurable findings. 
(Kerr & Ewing 2018, 18-19) 
Even if the hunting does not uncover any findings, it does not mean that the hunt 
was a failure. Hunts usually produce other measurable benefits beside findings. 
Hunting can uncover gaps in detection or defenses and produce new methods to fill 
them. Insecure or insufficient security practices can be detected and corrected. 
Hunting can identify new sources of data to collect. Hunts should also reduce the 
number of false positive incidents over time. (Sqrrl n.d, 12) 
3.2 Attack lifecycle frameworks 
3.2.1 Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain 
Kill chain is a systematic process to target and engage an adversary to create desired 
effects (Hutchins, Cloppert & Amin 2010). This process is described as a “chain” 
because any single deficiency will interrupt the entire process. Originating from the 
military sector, Lockheed Martin has adopted the concept to information security as 
the Intrusion Kill Chain. (Ibid.) 
The Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain includes seven phases: Reconnaissance, 
Weaponization, Delivery, Exploitation, Installation, Command and Control (C2) and 
Actions on Objectives. The reconnaissance phase includes an adversary searching, 
identifying and selecting the intrusion target using e.g. public Internet sources. In the 
weaponization phase, an adversary creates exploit payload, often by injecting some 
sort of remote access Trojan into client application file, such as Microsoft Office 
document or PDF. The Delivery is a phase where an adversary transmits the 
exploitation payload to the target environment, using methods such as email 
attachments or phishing websites. In the exploitation phase, the exploit payload 
triggers the adversary’s code by exploiting an application or operating system 
vulnerability or the user itself. The installation phase includes installation of a remote 
access Trojan or backdoor for maintaining persistence. The command and control 
phase includes the compromised host establishing connection to external control 
server outside of the environment. Finally, in the actions and objectives phase, the 
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adversary takes action to archive their original objectives, such as stealing data or 
moving laterally to more lucrative target. (Ibid.) 
The intrusion kill chain provides a structure to analyze intrusions, extract indicators 
and drive defensive courses of actions. Organizations can use it to align their 
defensive capabilities to specific processes adversaries might undertake to target the 
organization, as well as measure their performance and plan investment roadmaps 
to rectify any capability gaps. This approach acts as essence of intelligence-driven 
defense, where security decisions are based on understanding of the adversary. 
(Ibid.) 
3.2.2 Mandiant’s Attack Lifecycle Model 
Cybersecurity company Mandiant have defined their own lifecycle model called the 
Mandiant’s Attack Lifecycle Model. Mandiant’s model describes the different phases 
of compromise more granularly than the Lockheed Martin Intrusion Kill Chain. The 
model includes eight phases as illustrated in the Figure 2: Initial Reconnaissance, 
Initial Compromise, Establish Foothold, Establish Foothold, Internal Reconnaissance, 
Move Laterally, Maintain Presence and Complete Mission. (CYBER ATTACK LIFECYCLE 
n.d.) 
 
Figure 2. Mandiant’s Attack Lifecycle Model (Mandiant 2013, 27) 
 
In the initial reconnaissance phase, the adversary conducts research on target, 
chooses target assets (e.g. systems, people and processes) and an attack 
methodology. The initial compromise phase includes the adversary successfully 
executing malicious code on the target systems. In the establish foothold phase, the 
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adversary establishes persistent control over the compromised systems. In the 
escalate privileges phase, the adversary aims to gain greater access to the 
compromised systems, for example by compromising an administrative user account. 
The internal reconnaissance phase includes the adversary discovering information 
about structure, systems or users in the target environment. In the move laterally 
phase, the adversary uses the information gained in the reconnaissance phase to 
expand their foothold by moving between systems in the compromised 
environment. The maintain presence phase includes the adversary installing different 
types of backdoors and remote connections to further solidify their foothold. In the 
complete missions phase, the adversary completes their original, which could be to 
steal intellectual property or cause service disruption. (CYBER ATTACK LIFECYCLE 
n.d.) 
3.2.3 MITRE ATT&CK 
The MITRE ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge) is a 
globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on 
real-world observations (MITRE ATT&CK® n.d.). The ATT&CK is developed by MITRE 
Corporation, a non-for-profit organization which provides engineering and technical 
guidance for the United States federal government. Started in 2013, the project was 
released to the public in 2015 (Storm 2018). 
The ATT&CK focuses on identifying adversary behaviors instead of typical indicators, 
such as IP addresses, domain names or file hashes. Focusing on adversary tactics and 
techniques allows development of analytics that better capture how adversaries 
interact with systems during an operation. Another focus of the ATT&CK is 
applicability to real environments. The techniques included in the framework should 
be based on real observed incidents. (Storm 2018) 
The ATT&CK knowledge base consists of adversarial techniques, which contain 
breakdown and classification of offensively oriented actions that can be used against 
particular platforms. The ATT&CK contain information on how a technique works, list 
of the adversary groups that have utilized it, as well as detection and mitigation 
methods. Techniques are further categorized into tactics, which describe an 
adversary’s tactical objectives during operations, such as persist, discover targets or 
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move laterally. Some techniques are included in multiple tactic categories as they 
can be used to accomplish multiple different objectives. In other words, techniques 
describe how an adversary performs an action and tactics describes why they do it. 
(Storm 2018) 
The relationships between the tactics and techniques are visualized in the ATT&CK 
matrices. The ATT&CK includes matrices for enterprise, PRE-ATT&CK, mobile and ICS. 
Figure 3 illustrates the (partial) enterprise matrix. The enterprise matrix includes 12 
tactics: initial access, execution, persistence, privilege escalation, defense evasion, 
credential access, discovery, lateral movement, collection, command and control, 
exfiltration and impact. The tactics and techniques covered in the thesis are 
described in the Implementation section. 
 
Figure 3. ATT&CK enterprise matrix (partial) 
 
Compared to other intrusion kill chain models, the MITRE ATT&CK provides the most 
comprehensive set of intrusion phases and adversary behaviors. The ATT&CK 
includes plenty of actionable information about different techniques, such as 
detection and mitigation methods that can be used, for example, to perform 
defensive gap analysis, red teaming or adversary emulation. MITRE also provides 
additional open source tools based on the ATT&CK information, such as Cyber 
Analytics Repository (CAR) and CALDERA adversary emulation framework. 
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3.3 Graph Theory 
Graph theory is a subset of discrete mathematics that specializes on studying of 
graphs. A graph consists of a set of vertices (often referred as nodes) connected by a 
set of edges (often referred as links). In other words, a graph G is an ordered pair 
consisting of a set V(G) of vertices and a set E(G), disjoint from V(G), of edges, 
together with an incidence function ψG that associates with each edge of G an 
unordered pair of vertices of G (Boundy & Murty 2008, 2). 
Graphs are used to model relationships between objects and are usually represented 
graphically, which helps to understand many of their properties. Each vertex in a 
graph is indicated by a point, and each edge by a line joining the points. Relative 
positions of the points (vertices) and lines (edges) usually have no significance. Figure 
4 shows two example graph diagrams. (Boundy & Murty 2008, 2) 
 
Figure 4. Graph diagram examples 
 
The ends of an edge are said to be incident with the edge, and vice versa. Two 
vertices incident with a common edge or two edges incident with a common vertex 
are considered adjacent, and two distinct adjacent vertices are considered 
neighbours. An edge with identical ends is called a loop, while an edge with distinct 
ends is called a link. Two or more links with the same pair of ends are said to be 
parallel edges. A graph with no loops or parallel edges is called a simple graph. 
(Boundy & Murty 2008, 3-4) 
Path is a simple graph with vertices arranged in a linear sequence in a way that two 
vertices are adjacent if they are consecutive in the sequence and are nonadjacent 
otherwise. Cycle is a simple graph whose vertices can be arranged in a cyclic 
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sequence, for example three or more vertices arranged in a cyclic sequence in such a 
way that two vertices are adjacent if they are consecutive in the sequence, and are 
nonadjacent otherwise. Degree of a vertex is the number of edges incident to it. 
(Boundy & Murty 2008, 4) Figure 5 illustrates examples of different graph types. 
 
Figure 5. Graph types 
 
Directed graph is a type of graph where the edges have assigned orientations. 
Formally, a directed graph D is an ordered pair (V (D),A(D)) consisting of a set V := V 
(D) of vertices and a set A := A(D), disjoint from V (D), of arcs, together with an 
incidence function ψD that associates with each arc of D an ordered pair of (not 
necessarily distinct) vertices of D (Boundy & Murty 2008, 31). If a is an arc and 
ψD(a)=(u,v), then a is said to join u to v. The vertex u is said to be tail of a, and the 
vertex v its head. The vertex u is also said to dominate vertex v. Vertices which 
dominate a particular vertex are considered be its in-neighbors and those that are 
dominated by the vertex its outneighbours. (Boundy & Murty 2008, 31) 
All concepts of a regular graph apply to directed graphs as well, such as the degree of 
vertex. Two concepts specific to directed graphs are indegree and outdegree. 
Indegree of a vertex v is the number of arcs with head v and outdegree is the number 
of arcs with tail v. (Boundy & Murty 2008, 32) 
Weighted graph is a type of graph where vertices or edges have numeric weights 
associated with them. These weights could represent, for example a cost, distance or 
capacity. Weighted graphs are used in longest or shortest path calculations. (Boundy 
& Murty 2008, 50) Figure 6 illustrates examples of directed and weighted graphs. 
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Figure 6. Directed and weighted graph 
 
4 Implementation 
4.1 Scope 
The implementation of the research starts with the definition of scope. Scope 
definition means narrowing down the subject into most relevant items. In the 
context of the thesis, this means selecting platforms, event sources, tactics and 
techniques to concentrate on. Defining the scope is necessary for preventing the 
thesis from expanding too large. 
The author used Microsoft Windows as the operating system platform for the 
implementation and Windows Event Log and System Monitor (Sysmon) as event 
sources on the operating system. These selections are based on the requirements of 
thesis assigner. As previously mentioned, the information about adversary tactics are 
sourced from MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base. From the ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix 
12 tactic categories, eight were chosen for the implementation: execution, 
persistence, privilege escalation, defense evasion, credential access, discovery, 
lateral movement and command and control. These tactics were chosen based on 
the number of known techniques they contain and the requirements from the thesis 
assigner. 
Since the number of different techniques is too large to fully cover in this thesis, 
three techniques from the previously mentioned tactic categories were selected 
based on popularity among adversary groups. In addition to their website, MITRE 
offers the ATT&CK content in Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) format 
from their Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information (TAXII) server. 
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STIX is a language and serialization format used to exchange cyber threat intelligence 
(CTI) in a consistent and machine-readable manner (Jordan, Piazza & Wunder 2017). 
TAXII is an application layer protocol used to exchange CTI over HTTPS by defining an 
API that aligns with common sharing models (Davidson, Jordan & Wunder 2017). 
Python libraries developed by MITRE were used to fetch STIX 2 objects from their 
TAXII server and Pandas library used to group, sort and count the technique objects 
to get the top three by tactic category. The first step is to get the top 10 adversary 
groups with most techniques. The script developed to accomplish this is displayed in 
Appendix 1. Table 1 illustrates output of the script. 
Table 1. Top 10 adversary groups by number of techniques 
Group Techniques 
APT32 55 
Lazarus Group 54 
APT28 48 
APT3 43 
OilRig 41 
Dragonfly 2.0 41 
Threat Group-3390 39 
Patchwork 34 
menuPass 32 
BRONZE BUTLER 31 
 
The second step is to get the top most used techniques the groups for each tactic 
category. The script developed to accomplish this is displayed in in Appendix 2. Table 
2 illustrates output of the script. 
Table 2. Top three techniques by tactic category 
Tactic Technique Count 
command-and-control Remote File Copy 10 
 Standard Application Layer Protocol 7 
 Commonly Used Port 5 
credential-access Credential Dumping 10 
 Input Capture 6 
 Brute Force 4 
defense-evasion File Deletion 10 
 Scripting 9 
 Obfuscated Files or Information 8 
discovery Account Discovery 7 
 System Network Configuration Discovery 7 
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 File and Directory Discovery 7 
execution Command-Line Interface 10 
 Scripting 9 
 PowerShell 9 
lateral-movement Remote File Copy 10 
 Remote Desktop Protocol 6 
 Windows Admin Shares 3 
persistence Scheduled Task 8 
 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder 7 
 Valid Accounts 7 
privilege-escalation Scheduled Task 8 
 Valid Accounts 7 
 New Service 4 
4.2 Tools 
The implementation of the thesis required tools for collecting events from endpoints, 
processing and analyzing them. The tools were selected based on how well the 
features supported the objectives of the thesis and how popular they were among 
the threat hunting community. A requirement from the thesis assigner was that the 
tools should be free and/or open-source. 
4.2.1 Sysmon 
System Monitor (Sysmon) is a Windows system service and device driver that 
monitors and logs system activity to a Windows Event Log. It is part of Windows 
Sysinternals collection of tools created by Mark Russinovich (Sysmon 2019). Once 
installed, Sysmon provides detailed information on many common system activities 
including: 
 Process creation and termination 
 File creation 
 Network activity 
 Registry modification 
 Driver loading 
 DLL loading 
 
Sysmon enables granular filtering and tagging of events the user is interested in 
collecting. (Sysmon 2019) 
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Sysmon in widely used in the security and threat hunting communities for its ability 
to generate information about events that Windows Event Log does not capture. 
There are many ready-made Sysmon configuration files available for security 
monitoring. The one chose for the base configuration of the implementation was the 
SwiftOnSecurity configuration, which is one of the most popular Sysmon 
configurations among security community. It aims to capture the most important 
events without generating an excess amount of data. 
4.2.2 HELK 
The Hunting ELK (HELK) is an open source threat hunting platform created by 
Roberto Rodriguez. HELK provides advanced analytics capabilities, such as structured 
streaming, graph analytics and machine learning of which hunters can take 
advantage. It is composed of several existing open-source components integrated 
into ELK stack. HELK is distributed in Docker containers, which makes it easy to 
deploy and scale. (Rodriguez 2018a). Figure 7 illustrates the HELK components. 
 
Figure 7. HELK components (Rodriguez 2018a) 
 
HELK currently supports data collection from Windows endpoints using Winlogbeat, 
which streams Windows Event Logs to Kafka. Kafka is a distributed publish-subscribe 
messaging system used for building real-time data pipelines and streaming apps. 
Data consumers can subscribe to Kafka topics to receive data. (Rodriguez 2018) 
The core of the HELK platform is the ELK stack, which consists of Elasticsearch, 
Logstash and Kibana. Elasticsearch is a distributed search and analytics engine for all 
types of data, structured or unstructured. It can scale horizontally for resiliency and 
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allows parallel processing across distributed nodes. Elasticsearch allows running of 
complex queries against data and uses aggregations to generate summaries. 
Elasticsearch is the central repository where ingested data is stored in HELK. 
Elasticsearch is well suited for log data storage because of its ability to ingest various 
types of data, speed and scalability and its powerful query language. Analytics tools 
in the HELK platform use Elasticsearch REST API to access the data. (What is 
Elasticsearch? n.d.) 
Logstash is a data collection engine with real-time, pluggable pipelining capabilities. 
Logstash can receive data from many different sources, parse, normalize and enrich 
it, and send the processed data to some other destination for storage or additional 
processing. The event processing pipeline consists of three stages: inputs, filters and 
outputs. The input stage handles getting the data into Logstash from different 
sources, for example files on disk or through protocols such as Syslog. The filter stage 
filters, parses, normalizes and enriches the data. Finally, the output stage will handle 
sending the data to a particular destination, for example a database. Logstash ships 
with a wide range of different plugins for each of the three stages. HELK uses 
Logstash for its flexible event processing pipeline and native integration with 
message queues and Elasticsearch. HELK Logstash receives data from Kafka topics, 
processes it and sends to Elasticsearch. HELK also includes configuration for parsing 
Windows Event Logs, Sysmon and PowerShell logs. (Logstash Introduction n.d.) 
Kibana is an analytics and visualization platform designed to work with Elasticsearch. 
Kibana can be used to view, search and visualize data stored in Elasticsearch. 
Kibana’s Discovery view provides an easy to use interface for exploring data, 
executing search queries and filtering the results. Query results can be filtered by 
field values for specified timeframe and saved for later use. The visualize view 
enables creation of visualizations, such as line, bar or pie charts based on data. 
Visualizations can be combined into dashboards on the dashboard view. HELK 
includes ready-made saved searches, visualizations and dashboards for threat 
hunting. (Introduction n.d.) 
In addition to ELK stack, HELK includes advanced analytics capabilities via Apache 
Spark and GraphFrames. Apache Spark is a fast and general-purpose cluster 
computing system that provides high-level APIs in Java, Scala, Python and R 
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languages. Spark is based on a resilient distributed dataset (RDD), a collection of 
elements partitioned across the nodes of the cluster. This architecture enables 
parallel processing of data and fault-tolerance. Spark supports a rich set of higher-
level tools including Spark SQL for SQL and structured data processing, MLlib for 
machine learning, GraphX for graph processing, and Spark Streaming. (Spark 
Overview n.d.) 
HELK includes ES-Hadoop library for Spark to be able access data stored on 
Elasticsearch. Elasticsearch-Hadoop (ES-Hadoop) is a stand-alone, self-contained, 
small library that allows Hadoop jobs to interact with Elasticsearch. It can be 
described as a connector that allows data to flow bi-directionally so that applications 
can leverage the Elasticsearch engine capabilities transparently. ES-Hadoop acts as a 
passive component, allowing Hadoop jobs to use it as a library and interact with it 
through APIs. ES-Hadoop support Spark, Spark Streaming, SparkSQL and MapReduce 
based libraries such as Hive, Storm, Pig and Cascading. (Elasticsearch for Apache 
Hadoop n.d.) 
GraphFrames is a package for Spark, which provides DataFrame-based Graphs. It 
aims to extend the functionality of existing Spark graph analytics component GraphX 
by taking advantage of Spark DataFrames. The extended functionality includes motif 
finding, DataFrame-based serialization, and highly expressive graph queries. 
Graphframes provides high-level APIs in Scala, Java, and Python, that make it easy to 
search for patterns within graphs and find important vertices. HELK enables users to 
run queries using GraphFrames to find connections between event data stored in 
Elasticsearch. (GraphFrames Overview n.d.) 
HELK also includes JupyterLab for running Spark and GraphFrame queries through 
Spark Python API. JupyterLab is a web-based interactive development environment 
for Jupyter notebooks, code, and data. Jupyter Notebook is an open-source web 
application that allows users to create and share documents that contain live code, 
equations, visualizations and narrative text. Jupyter Notebook can run code 
interactively and display the output inside the document. JupyterLab provides a 
flexible web-interface, which can be arranged into supporting many types of 
workflows. JupyterLab features include consoles for running code, terminals for 
system shells and support for multiple file formats. (Jupyter n.d.) 
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HELK was chosen as the threat hunting platform for the implementation, because it 
includes all the essential components for data collection, processing and visualization 
in a single integrated and easy to install package. 
4.2.3 Pandas 
Pandas is a Python package that provides fast, flexible, and expressive data 
structures designed to make working with data both easy and intuitive. It aims to be 
the fundamental high-level building block for practical, real world data analysis in 
Python. Pandas can handle many types of data, such as tabular, ordered and 
unordered, arbitrary matrix or any other statistical data. It also enables easy 
reshaping, slicing, and aggregation of data. Pandas is built on top of a powerful 
scientific computing library NumPy. (Package overview n.d.) 
Pandas provides two primary data structures: series and dataframe. Series is a 1-
dimensional labeled homogeneously-typed array. Dataframe is a 2-dimensional 
tabular, column-oriented data structure with both a column and a row index. Panda’s 
dataframe was used to store and manipulate event data from Elasticsearch. (Package 
overview n.d.) 
4.2.4 NetworkX 
NetworkX is a Python package for creation, manipulation, and study of the structure, 
dynamics, and functions of complex networks (NetworkX n.d.). NetworkX features 
data structures for graphs, directed graphs and multigraphs. It supports many 
standard graph algorithms, network structures and analysis measures. NetworkX 
allows graph nodes to be represented as any object (e.g. text, image) and associating 
arbitrary data on graph edges (e.g. weights or other attributes). NetworkX was used 
for generating the kill chain graph from event data. (NetworkX n.d.) 
4.2.5 Plotly 
Plotly.py is an interactive, open source Python plotting library supporting over 40 
unique chart types covering a wide range of statistical, financial, geographic, 
scientific, and 3-dimensional data visualization use-cases. Plotly.py is built on top of 
Plotly JavaScript library (plotly.js), enabling creation of interactive web-based 
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visualizations. Plotly visualizations can be displayed in Jupyter notebooks, saved as 
standalone HTML files, exported as image files or served through Python web 
application by using Dash. Plotly was used for visualizing graphs inside Jupyter Lab. 
(Getting Started with Plotly in Python n.d.) 
4.3 Test Environment 
In order to observe event data generated by different adversary techniques, a simple 
test environment was set up. The environment was built on top of JYVSECTEC 
virtualized private cloud, and it consists of workstation and server segments with a 
router in the middle. The workstation segment includes two Windows 7 and two 
Windows 10 workstations. The server segment includes Windows Server 2012 R2 
server that acts as Active Directory Domain Controller and CentOS 7 Linux server that 
hosts the HELK platform. The test environment is illustrated in the Figure 8. 
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172.16.100.10
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Figure 8. Test environment 
 
The workstations and the domain controller are part of the actual test environment 
where the techniques were observed. Event data collected from these endpoints was 
sent to HELK server for parsing, normalization and analysis. 
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Few preparation tasks needed to be done before the actual testing and observation 
phase. The first step was to install the latest updates for the operating systems. The 
next step was to install latest version of Sysmon (10.2) with the SwiftOnSecurity base 
configuration on workstations and domain controller. Winlogbeat was also installed 
on the endpoints for shipping the Windows Event Logs to HELK server. Winlogbeat 
configuration included in HELK was used which monitors event logs from standard 
Application, Security and System channels, as well as Sysmon, Powershell and WMI-
activity channels. The configuration sends event logs to Kafka winlogbeat-topic on 
the HELK server. The complete configuration is listed in Appendix 5. 
4.4 Testing and Observation 
The testing and observation part of the implementation includes identifying the data 
sources for each selected technique, testing the techniques on the environment, 
observing the generated events and developing rules to map the relevant events to 
right techniques and tactic categories. 
Identification of the data sources consists of recognizing the events related to the 
specific technique. This could include event types, such as failed login or specific 
fields inside an event, such as process start event with a specific process name. The 
MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base lists data sources and detection methods for most of 
the techniques as well as links to security reports that go into detail on how APT 
groups have utilized the technique. Appendix 4 contains a matrix of technique and 
tactic categories with the related Windows Event Log IDs observed during the 
testing. 
After the data sources associated with a technique are identified, the next step is to 
test the execution of the technique, observe the generated events and record each 
observation into the observation diary. A simple spreadsheet for the observation 
diary was used, where each line represents an observed technique and columns the 
observed items. For each technique, the observation time, tactic category, technique 
ID, technique name, operating system, description of steps to execute the technique 
and list of relevant generated events were recorded. The observation diary is 
displayed in Appendix 3. 
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Based on the observed events, rules were developed to match specific types of 
events or their content and enrich the events with information about the technique. 
This process can be implemented on the endpoint where the events are generated 
using, for example Sysmons ability to tag events, or on the HELK server using the 
Logstash data enrichment capabilities. Logstash was chosen because of its rich data 
matching capabilities and ability to enrich data from external sources. Another 
advantage of using this approach is that Logstash processes all the events collected 
from the environment, not just what Sysmon produces. 
Winlogbeat, which streams events to Logstash will automatically parse them into 
structured format that can be easily consumed by Logstash. The HELK Logstash 
includes rules for further parsing and normalizing the events into a form that is easy 
to filter and aggregate. These make it easier to create Logstash filters that match 
events based on the content. 
For enriching the event data with information about the techniques, the MITRE 
Python libraries were again used to fetch technique information from their servers, 
which then was uploaded into Elasticsearch. This made it possible to use Logstash 
Elasticsearch-filter to find a specific technique document from Elasticsearch based on 
technique ID and then to add certain fields from that technique document to the 
events itself. 
Figure 9 contains an example of Logstash filter to match events and enrich then with 
information about a technique. 
 
Figure 9. Logstash filter example 
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In row 3 is the condition to match the events to the filter, in this case the 
process_name or the process_parent_name fields must match to “cmd.exe”. If the 
event matches the condition, the Elasticsearch filter (rows 5-13) is executed. 
Elasticsearch filter looks for documents from the Elasticsearch (row 6) mitre-attack 
index (row 7). If the document matches the query (row 8) that specifies technique ID, 
the fields (tactic, technique, technique_id) from that document are added to the 
event. Similar filters were created for each observed technique. Each filter was 
placed in a separate file on /root/HELK/docker/helk-logstash/pipeline folder where 
Logstash reads its pipeline configuration. 
Kibana was used to verify that the right information was added to the events, as seen 
in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Logstash filter verification 
 
4.5 Execution 
Execution is a tactic where the adversary is trying to run malicious code on the 
systems to which he has gained access. This is often paired with techniques from 
other tactic categories to achieve broader goals, such as network discovery or 
exfiltration of data. (Execution n.d.) 
4.5.1 T1059 - Command-Line Interface 
Command-line interface (CLI) is a way to interact with computer systems by issuing 
commands using lines of text either locally or via a remote session. It is a common 
feature across many operating systems, including Windows and Unix-type operating 
systems such as Linux and macOS. Adversaries often use command-line interface to 
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execute built-in commands in operating systems and launch external software. 
(Command-Line Interface n.d.) 
The main command interpreter for Windows is the Cmd.exe. Windows PowerShell 
also provides command line interface, which is covered separately in the technique 
T1086. According to MITRE ATT&CK, data sources for command-line interface are 
process and process command-line parameter monitoring. Both data sources can be 
captured using Sysmon. According to the documentation, Sysmon “logs process 
creation with full command line for both current and parent processes” (Sysmon 
2019). 
The technique was tested on workstation ws-w10-1 by opening the cmd.exe and 
executing command “netstat –a –n”, which can be used to list open network 
connections. Resulting events were recorded to the observation diary. Running the 
test resulted in Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create), as illustrated in Figure 11: 
 
Figure 11. T1059 - Process create event 
 
As can be seen in the Figure 11, Sysmon records both the parent process 
(ParentImage) and the actual process (Image) as well as command-line parameters 
for both. To match this technique in Logstash, filter as seen in Appendix 6 was 
created that matches when the process_name or the parent_process_name is 
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“cmd.exe”. This filter matches processes that are started from Cmd.exe or when 
Cmd.exe is started by another process. Figure 12 verifies that technique information 
was added to the event after the test was re-run: 
 
Figure 12. T1059 Kibana verification 
 
4.5.2 T1064 – Scripting 
Scripting is a way to automate the execution of tasks in a programmatic way. Many 
command-line interpreters, such as Windows Cmd and PowerShell support execution 
of scripts at run-time. In addition to execution other processes, scripting languages 
can often interact with operating system APIs directly. Common scripting languages 
used in Windows platform are batch files, PowerShell and VBScript. Windows also 
has Windows Script Host (WSH) engine which provides environment for running 
scripts in a variety of languages. WSH scripts can be executed in command-line mode 
using cscript.exe or in GUI mode using wscrip.exe (Scripting n.d.) 
Adversaries prefer scripting for speeding up operations and ability to bypass process 
monitoring mechanisms by interacting through the operating system APIs. 
Adversaries can download scripts from the Internet and execute them without 
creating files on the system. Scripts can also be hidden inside other files, such as 
Office documents or PDF files, which execute the script when a user opens the file. 
Scripting is heavily utilized by popular offensive frameworks such as Metasploit and 
PowerSploit. (Scripting n.d.) 
MITRE ATT&CK lists process, file and command-line parameter monitor as data 
sources for detecting scripting. The technique was tested by first creating a simple 
batch file “test.bat” which simply prints a text to console and executes it by using the 
Windows Run dialog. This generated the Sysmon Process Create event shown in 
Figure 13: 
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Figure 13. T1064 – Scripting 
 
A similar VBScript file “test.vbs” was also created and executed using cscript.exe. 
Figure 14 displays the resulting event. 
 
Figure 14. T1064 - Scripting 2 
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In order to match scripting related events, Logstash filter was created (Appendix 7) 
that matches when WHS engine is executed using the cscript.exe or wscript.exe. The 
same filter also matches when the process_command_line includes filename 
extension used with common scripting languages. Figure 15 verifies that the 
technique information was added to the events after the test was re-run: 
 
Figure 15. T1064 Kibana verification 
 
4.5.3 T1086 – PowerShell 
PowerShell is an interactive command-line interface and scripting language built on 
.NET. It helps system administrators to automate common operating system 
management tasks and provides the command-line for executing other processes. 
PowerShell has been included in Windows since Windows 7 and the latest version, 
PowerShell Core is a fully open-source and cross-platform implementation. 
(PowerShell n.d. a) 
Most of the tasks in PowerShell are executed using cmdlets, which are simple, single-
function command-line tools built into the shell. Unlike most text-based shells, 
PowerShell accepts and returns objects, which can be piped from one cmdlet to 
another. PowerShell providers allow interaction with data stores such as registry and 
certificate stores as easily as accessing the file system. (Getting Started with 
Windows PowerShell n.d.) 
PowerShell has become a popular tool among adversary groups because of its 
versatility and wide range of capabilities to automate, hide and obscure activities. 
PowerShell scripts can be hidden into other files, used to run executables from the 
Internet and even embedded into other applications for execution without the 
powershell.exe interpreter. PowerShell based offensive testing tools include Empire, 
PowerSploit and PSAttack. (PowerShell n.d. b) 
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There are multiple ways to capture PowerShell activity, including DLL monitoring, 
process monitoring, registry monitoring, file monitoring and logging (PowerShell n.d. 
b). The implementation concentrates on PowerShell logging, because it includes the 
most amount of information and catches instances where PowerShell is run without 
executing the powershell.exe. 
PowerShell has support for three types of logging: module logging, script block 
logging, and transcription. These events are written to the Windows Event Log under 
the path: Microsoft-windows-PowerShell/Operational. Module logging (Event ID 
4103) records pipeline execution details as PowerShell executes, including variable 
initialization and command invocations. It also records the output of the executed 
commands. Script block logging (Event ID 4104) records blocks of code as they are 
executed by the PowerShell engine, capturing the full context of the executed code, 
including scripts and commands. Script block logging will also de-obfuscated code 
obfuscated by PowerShell EncodedCommand argument or commonly used XOR and 
Base64 encodings. Transaction logging creates a unique record of every PowerShell 
session including all input and output. Transactions are not written to Windows 
Event Log but into text files that are broken out by user and session. (Dunwoody 
2016) 
For testing the technique, both module and script block logging were enabled on all 
hosts through Active Directory Group Policy. These event types record all the 
relevant PowerShell activity and can be easily consumed through the event log. 
The technique was first tested by creating “test.ps1” script that simply executes the 
“get-process” cmdlet. The script was executed using the PowerShell interpreter, 
which generated the event shown in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. T1086 – PowerShell 
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Figure 17. T1086 - PowerShell 2 
 
Figure 16 displays a script block logging event which states that script ”test.ps1” was 
executed and it contains “get-process” statement. Figure 17 displays a module 
logging event that list more information about the “get-process” command 
execution. Multiple other module and script block events were also generated. 
It was tested if the PowerShell logging would capture executing script from within 
another application. For this purpose, existing C#/.NET application developed by 
Keith Babinec (Babinec 2014) was used. Executing the binary 
“PowerShellExecutionSample.exe” generated the events displayed in Figure 18 and 
Figure 19: 
 
Figure 18. T1086 - PowerShell 3 
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Figure 19. T1086 - PowerShell 4 
 
Script block event in Figure 18 displays the content of the embedded script and 
module logging event in Figure 19 correctly displays that the “get-service” command 
was executed from the “PowerShellExecutionSample.exe” binary. 
To match these events, Logstash filter as seen in Appendix 8 was created that 
matches events with ids of the module and script block logs. Figure 20 verifies that 
technique information was added to the events after the test was re-run: 
 
Figure 20. T1086 Kibana verification 
 
4.6 Persistence 
Persistence is a tactic where the adversary aims to maintain their foothold on 
systems where they have gained access. An adversary might lose access to the 
systems due to operating system restarts, credential changes, connection blocking or 
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removal of files or tools. The techniques in this category include any access, action, 
or configuration changes that let the adversary maintain their foothold on systems, 
such as replacing or hijacking legitimate code or adding startup code. (Persistence 
n.d.) 
4.6.1 T1053 – Scheduled Task 
Task scheduling is an operating system function that lets users create tasks that are 
run periodically or executed once on a specific time. They are often used to 
automate routine tasks and system maintenance. Adversaries can use scheduled 
tasks for various tactics, including execution, persistence and privilege escalation. For 
persistence, adversaries can create scheduled tasks that download and execute 
malicious code to regain foothold even if the malicious process is interrupted or code 
removed. 
Windows has a built-in component called Task Scheduler for performing automated 
tasks on a chosen computer. It executes tasks based on a trigger that can be based 
on features such as specific time or schedule, user logging in, system boot, or specific 
event happening on the system. The action that the task executes can be showing a 
message, sending email, executing command or firing a COM handle. Task Scheduler 
can be managed through graphical user interface taskschd.msc or command-line 
tools schtasks.exe and at.exe. (Task Scheduler n.d. a) 
Data sources for monitoring scheduled tasks include file monitoring, process 
monitoring and event logs (Task Scheduler n.d. b). Windows can generate event log 
records when a scheduled task is created (ID 4698), deleted (ID 4699), enabled (ID 
4700), disabled (ID 4701) or updated (ID 4702). These events are written into 
Windows Security log. 
In order to enable logging of task scheduler activity events on the test environment, 
Audit Other Object Access Events audit policy had to enable the for all hosts through 
Active Directory Group Policy. The technique was then tested by first creating a 
simple scheduled task using the “schtasks.exe” as shown in Figure 21: 
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Figure 21. Scheduled task creation using schtasks.exe 
 
The task is named “test” and executes C:\test.bat file every minute. The task creation 
generates Event ID 4698 as illustrated in Figure 22: 
 
Figure 22. T1053 - Scheduled Task 
 
The event contains information such as the task name, triggers and actions. Event ID 
4702 (Figure 24) is generated when the task is changed: 
 
Figure 23. Scheduled task update 
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Figure 24. T1053 - Scheduled Task 2 
 
Task creation was also tested using the “at.exe” (Figure 25), which is used to 
schedule a task to be run on a specific time. 
 
Figure 25. Scheduled task creation using at.exe 
 
The task created (ID 4698) event was again generated as seen in Figure 26: 
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Figure 26. T1053 - Scheduled Task 3 
 
To match the scheduled task creation and update events, a Logstash filter was 
created (Appendix 9) that matches the event IDs 4698 and 4702. Figure 27 verifies 
that the technique information was added to the events. 
 
Figure 27. T1053 Kibana verification 
 
4.6.2 T1060 - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder 
Windows registry includes specific keys called Run and RunOnce, which cause 
programs to run each time that a user logs on. The difference between Run and 
RunOnce is that Run is executed every time a user logs on whereas RunOnce key is 
removed after execution. The value for the keys is a command line that gets 
executed and it is possible to register multiple programs under any particular key. 
(Run and RunOnce Registry Keys n.d) 
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While the registry run keys are often used by legitimate software, they are also used 
by adversaries for establishing persistency on a system. Another common 
persistence technique the adversaries use is Windows startup folders. Windows 
startup folder contains shortcuts to an application that starts when the system boots. 
Detecting the use of these techniques requires monitoring changes to the relevant 
registry keys and monitoring file system changes on the startup folder locations. The 
paths from registry run keys are: 
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run 
 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce 
 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run 
 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce 
 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx 
 
Changes to registry keys can be monitored using Sysmon and the configuration used 
in the implementation includes a rule that matches the key paths: 
<TargetObject condition="contains">CurrentVersion\Run</TargetObject> 
To test run keys, a registry value as seen in Figure 28 was created: 
 
Figure 28. Create registry run key 
 
Here, a string type value “Test” is created for the Run key under the 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER hierarchy. It contains value “C:\test.bat” which instructs 
Windows to run the script next time the user logs on. This can be verified from the 
Sysmon Process create event generated after logging on as seen in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29. Windows run key execution 
 
Creation of the registry value generated the Sysmon event illustrated in Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30. T1060 - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder 
 
The figure above shows that Sysmon records type of change, target key, value and 
process that requested the change. To catch events where registry run key is set, a 
Logstash filter was created (Appendix 10) that matches events with event ID 13 
(Registry value set) and registry path that contains “CurrentVersion\Run”. Figure 31 
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verifies that the technique information was added to the event.
 
Figure 31. T1060 Kibana verification 
 
Windows startup folders are located under individual user’s profiles 
(C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start 
Menu\Programs\Startup) and under ProgramData for all users 
(C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp). Sysmon 
configuration used in the implementation includes a rule that captures file creation 
events on these folders: 
<TargetFilename condition="contains">\Startup\</TargetFilename> 
To test the rule, a shortcut pointing to the “C:\test.bat” file on the startup folder for 
all users was created. The shortcut creation generated Sysmon file created event ID 
11 as illustrated in Figure 32: 
 
Figure 32. T1060 - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder 2 
 
An entry previous Logstash filter was added to matches the events with event ID 11 
(File created) and the file name containing “\startup”. Figure 33 verifies that the 
technique information was added to the event. 
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Figure 33. T1060 Kibana verification 2 
 
4.6.3 T1078 - Valid Accounts 
User accounts in Windows can be divided into three categories: default, local and 
domain accounts. Default accounts include built-in accounts such as Administrator 
and Guest, which are created automatically and cannot be removed. Local accounts 
are local to the system they are created whereas domain accounts are managed by 
Active Directory Domain Services and are shared across systems that are part of the 
domain. Accounts can also be categorized into user, administrator and service 
accounts. User accounts are used by normal users and often have low privileges. 
Administrator accounts are used by system administrators and have high privileges. 
Service accounts are created for system services to allow them to access local and 
network resources. Adversaries may use user accounts for persistency by creating 
new accounts that they can use in case access to others is lost. (Valid Accounts n.d.) 
The main method for monitoring user account related activity in Windows is the 
security audit logs. The user account management events are particularly relevant 
for the persistence tactic. These events indicate for example if a user account was 
created, changed or deleted. The implementation concentrated on event ID 4720 (A 
user account was created), which is generated every time a new user object is 
created. 
To test this technique, Audit User Account Management audit policy had to be 
enabled for all hosts through Active Directory Group Policy. A local user account was 
then created on one of the workstations, which generated the event ID 4720 as seen 
in Figure 34: 
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Figure 34. T1078 - Valid Accounts 
 
The event includes base information (security id, account name and domain) about 
the created account as well as included attributes. The subject field also has 
information about the user that performed the action. A similar event was created 
when added domain user was added on the Active Directory Domain Controller as 
seen in Figure 35: 
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Figure 35. T1078 - Valid Accounts 2 
 
To catch these events, Logstash filter was added (Appendix 11) that matches the 
events with ID 4720. Figure 36 verifies that the technique information was added to 
the event. 
 
Figure 36. T1078 Kibana verification 
 
4.7 Privilege Escalation 
Privilege escalation tactic consists of techniques that adversaries use to gain higher-
level permissions on a system or network. Adversaries often gain initial access to 
systems through normal unprivileged user accounts. However, many of the 
techniques later in the kill chain require privileged account to be executed, thus the 
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adversary needs a way to escalate their privileges. Common ways to accomplish 
privilege escalation is to take advantage of system weaknesses, misconfiguration or 
vulnerabilities. (Privilege Escalation n.d.) 
4.7.1 T1053 – Scheduled Task 
Windows task scheduler can be used for privilege escalation by taking advantage of 
vulnerabilities in the operating system (Goodin 2019). The scheduled task technique 
was covered in detail in section 4.6.1. 
4.7.2 T1078 - Valid Accounts 
Adversaries can accomplish privilege escalation using existing unprivileged user or 
service accounts. User account privilege escalation is captured by several Windows 
audit events. The implementation concentrated on event ID 4672 (Special privileges 
assigned to a new logon), which is generated when a new logon session has sensitive 
privileges assigned to it. This event is an indicator that a user account has escalated 
privileges. 
Before testing the technique, the Audit Special Logon policy had to be turned on, 
which enables logging of 4672 event. The testing was conducted by logging into a 
workstation using the previously created test user and running Notepad software 
using administrator privileges. The following event was generates as a result as seen 
in Figure 37: 
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Figure 37. T1078 - Valid Accounts 3 
 
The event shows that specific sensitive privileges were assigned to a new logon with 
user account administrator. To capture these events, entry to previously created 
Logstash filter was added (Appendix 11), matching events with ID 4672 and where 
the user account is not SYSTEM. The reason for excluding SYSTEM is that logon 
events with this account happens frequently during normal system operations. 
Figure 38 verifies the technique information was added to the event. 
 
Figure 38. T1078 Kibana verification 2 
 
4.7.3 T1050 – New Service 
Services in Windows are applications that run in the system background without user 
interaction. Many of the core operating system features, such as event logging, file 
serving and printing are run as services. Services are often started automatically 
when the operating system boots. (Services n.d.) 
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Services can be executed using LocalSystem account, which enables an adversary 
with administrator account to escalate privileges to SYSTEM level. The event ID 7045 
(A new service was installed in the system) is generated in all modern Windows 
versions when a new service is created. There is also event ID 4697 (A service was 
installed in the system), which is generated in newer versions of Windows (Windows 
10 and Server 2016). 
To test the technique, Audit Security System Extension policy was first turned on, 
which enables logging of event ID 4697. Then a new service with the “sc.exe” tool 
was created as illustrated in Figure 39: 
 
Figure 39. Creating new service with sc.exe 
 
This generated both event ID 7045 and 4697 as seen in Figure 40 and Figure 41: 
 
Figure 40. T1050 - New Service 
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Figure 41. T1050 - New Service 2 
 
To capture these events, Logstash filter was created (Appendix 12) matching events 
with ID 7045 or 4697 and where the service account is LocalSystem. Figure 42 verifies 
the technique information was added to the event. 
 
Figure 42. T1050 Kibana verification 
 
4.8 Defense Evasion 
Adversaries utilize defense evasion techniques to avoid being detected. Defense 
evasion has become more important to adversaries, as the detection and defense 
technologies have become more sophisticated and their adoption increased. 
According to security company Red Canary (Beye & Nickels 2019), the defense 
evasion related threats have become the most commonly seen MITRE ATT&CK tactic 
among their customers. Common techniques in this tactic category include 
uninstalling/disabling security software, removing evidence and 
obfuscating/encrypting data. (Defense Evasion n.d.) 
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4.8.1 T1107 - File Deletion 
Adversaries often create files and download tools or malware to target systems for 
execution. These files can cause detection by security defenses or leave clues to 
investigators. To prevent this, adversaries may delete the files over the course of an 
intrusion or at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. (File Deletion 
n.d.) 
Operating systems have built-in tools for deleting files, such as the DEL function in 
Windows cmd.exe or Remove-Item cmdled in PowerShell. There are also many 
external tools which can be used to delete files. One such tool known to be used by 
adversary groups is the Windows Sysinternals SDelete. (File Deletion n.d.) 
Windows can produce several file system auditing related events, including ID 4660 
(An object was deleted) which logs file deletion. Unfortunately, these events are 
generated only if auditing settings are enabled on a file. Adversaries are unlikely to 
include these settings in their files. Another approach is to monitor command-line 
functions related to file deletion. The Windows cmd.exe DEL command is an internal 
function that can not be monitored using normal methods; hence it was decided to 
concentrate on the PowerShell Remove-Item cmdlet. Remove-Item cmdlet is used to 
delete one or more items, which can consist of various types, such as files, folders, 
registry keys or variables. 
The use of Remove-Item cmdlet was tested by removing one of the test scripts 
created earlier (Figure 43). 
 
Figure 43. Deleting file with Remove-Item cmdlet 
 
The PowerShell module logging event as seen in Figure 44 was generated as a result. 
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Figure 44. T1107 - File Deletion 
 
A Logstash filter was created (Appendix 13) that matches events with ID 4103 and 
where the command name is “Remove-Item”. Figure 45 verifies the technique 
information was added to the event. 
 
Figure 45. T1107 Kibana verification 
 
4.8.2 T1064 – Scripting 
In addition to execution, adversaries may use scripting for defense evasion. The 
ability to embed scripts into other files and the fact that scripting is often used for 
legitimate task make them harder to detect by security software. Scripts can also be 
executed without creating any files on the system. Scripting was covered in detail on 
section 4.5.2. 
57 
 
 
4.8.3 T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information 
Another defense evasion technique adversaries commonly utilize is obfuscating their 
files. Obfuscation can prevent signature-based security software from detecting the 
execution and make post-incident investigation harder. Common obfuscation 
techniques include encoding, compressing and encryption. Command-line interfaces 
have many built-in features that can be used for obfuscation information, such as 
environment variables, aliases and ability to receive commands from standard input 
stream. (Obfuscated Files or Information n.d.) 
Detecting obfuscation can be challenging using traditional string matching 
techniques, since the obfuscated data does not usually contain predictable patterns. 
One way to detect obfuscation is to look for suspicious escape characters, e.g. '''^''' 
and '''"''' included in commands (Obfuscated Files or Information n.d.). Another 
approach is to use statistical methods to analyze entropy and frequency of 
characters to detect anomalies (Bohannon & Holmes 2017). 
PowerShell can interpret commands encoded using the base64-encoding. This is 
done by inputting the base64-encoded string to “–EncodedCommand” option. This 
was tested by encoding “Get-Process” into base64-string and executing it with the 
EncodedCommand option as illustrated in Figure 46: 
 
Figure 46. PowerShell EncodedCommand 
 
PowerShell module logging records the options used with execution as well as de-
obfuscated commands as seen in Figure 47. 
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Figure 47. T1027 - Obfuscated Files or Information 
 
Logstash filter was created (Appendix 14) matching events with ID 4103 and where 
the command line includes the EncodedCommand option. Figure 48 verifies the 
technique information was added to the event. 
 
Figure 48. T1027 Kibana verification 
 
4.9 Credential Access 
Credential access tactic category consists of techniques that adversaries use to steal 
credentials, such as account names and passwords. Stealing legitimate credentials 
can give an adversary access to systems, make them harder to detect, and provide 
the opportunity to create more accounts to help achieve their goals. (Credential 
Access n.d.) 
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4.9.1 T1003 - Credential Dumping 
Credential dumping is a technique where an adversary tries to obtain credentials 
from a system or software. Credentials can be accessed from system databases or 
directly from memory, usually in some form of hash. 
Windows stores credentials in several databases and processes. Security Account 
Manager (SAM) is a database that stores user accounts and security descriptors for 
users on the local computer (Security Account Manager (SAM) n.d.). Passwords are 
stored in SAM as LM or NTML hashes. When a user logs on, the credentials are 
stored in Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process, which is part of 
Local Security Authority (LSA) subsystem. LSA maintains information about all 
aspects of local security in a system and Its components run in the context of the 
Lsass.exe process (Security Subsystem Architecture n.d.) 
Many tools exist for accessing credential data stored in SAM or LSASS, but the 
implementation focuses on one the most widely used called Mimikatz. Mimikatz is a 
Windows tool developed by Benjamin Delpy to learn more about Windows 
credentials. It can be used to extract plaintext passwords, hashes, pin codes and 
Kerberos tickets directly from memory. While Mimikatz binary can be directly 
executed on a target system, more sophisticated methods exist that allow executing 
Mimikatz from memory or remotely. An example of this is the Invoke-Mimikatz 
PowerShell script that can reflectively load the Mimikatz DLL included in the script 
into memory without creating any files on the system. It can also run Mimikatz on 
remote systems using PowerShell remoting. (Metcalf 2018) 
One approach on detecting Mimikatz is to look for specific Windows DLL modules it 
loads when executed. This approach is effective since it is not dependent on which 
process loads the code or whether Mimikatz is executed from disk or memory. 
Roberto Rodriguez has written blog post (2017) where he was able to drill down the 
DLLs that Mimikatz loads into following five: 
 C:\Windows\System32\WinSCard.dll 
 C:\Windows\System32\cryptdll.dll 
 C:\Windows\System32\hid.dll 
 C:\Windows\System32\samlib.dll 
 C:\Windows\System32\vaultcli.dll 
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Sysmon event ID 7 (image loaded) records DDL modules loaded into a processes. This 
event is not enabled by default on the SwiftOnSecurity Sysmon configuration, so a 
new rule (Figure 49) was added to the configuration to log DDL modules loaded by 
powershell.exe process. 
 
Figure 49. Sysmon ImageLoad rule 
 
To test Mimikatz, the Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script was first uploaded to an 
external server. The .NET WebClient-class DownloadString method was then used to 
download the script into memory and execute it as seen in Figure 50: 
 
Figure 50. Invoke-Mimikatz execution 
 
Figure 50 displays how Mimikatz can dump hashes as well as plaintext passwords 
from LSASS process. Executing Mimikatz results in multiple Sysmon Image loaded 
events, one of which can be seen in Figure 51. 
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Figure 51. T1003 - Credential Dumping 
 
Figure 52 shows all the DLL modules loaded by Invoke-Mimikatz: 
 
Figure 52. Invoke-Mimikatz DLLs 
 
To capture events related to DLL modules loaded by Mimikatz, Logstash filter was 
created (Appendix 15) that matches the events with ID 7 and where the loaded 
module is one of the five DLLs listed earlier. Figure 53 verifies the technique 
information was added to the event. 
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Figure 53. T1003 Kibana verification 
 
4.9.2 T1056 – Input Capture 
Input capture is a technique where an adversary captures user’s input to obtain 
credentials or other sensitive information. Keylogging is the most widely used input 
capture method, where the adversary installs a software that records user’s 
keystrokes and sends them back to the adversary. Other common methods include 
presenting fake credential prompts to user, injecting code to login pages or wrapping 
the Windows default credential provider. (Input Capture n.d.) 
The technique was tested by using the credential provider method. Tyler Wrightson 
has created an example custom credential provider that could be utilized. The 
custom credential provider works by capturing credentials when a user logs in, 
writing credentials to a file and passing them on to the Windows default credential 
provider. (Wrightson 2012) 
Windows stores credential provider definitions in registry location: 
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\CredentialProvi
ders. Creation of new credential provider can be detected by monitoring Sysmon 
registry modification events. Figure 54 shows a Sysmon event that was generated 
when the custom credential provider was registered. 
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Figure 54. T1056 - Input Capture 
 
To capture these events, Logstash filter was created (Appendix 16) that matches 
events with ID 12 and where the registry target path is the credential provider path. 
Figure 55 verifies the technique information was added to the event. 
 
Figure 55. T1056 Kibana verification 
 
4.9.3 T1110 – Brute Force 
Brute force is a credential access technique where an adversary attempts to access 
user accounts without knowledge of the password. The adversary may attempt 
logins with a list of commonly used passwords. This method usually leads to 
numerous failed logins, which can trigger alarms or account lockouts. A more 
sophisticated strategy, called password spraying uses a single password or a small list 
of passwords against many different accounts to avoid triggering account lockouts or 
alarms. (Brute Force n.d.) 
If the adversary has obtained password hashes, they can use existing techniques to 
systematically guess the passwords or use pre-computed rainbow table to crack 
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hashes. The adversary can do the cracking outside of the target environment to avoid 
detection. (Brute Force n.d.) 
Brute force attempts can be detected by monitoring operating system authentication 
logs for an unusually high number of failed logins. Windows logs several 
authentication failure related events, but it was decided to focus on two common 
events: 4625 and 4771. The event ID 4625 (An account failed to log on) is generated 
on a local computer when a log on fails. The event ID 4771 (Kerberos pre-
authentication failed) is generated on a domain controller when Kerberos Key 
Distribution Center fails to issue Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). This event occurs when 
a user fails to authenticate using domain credentials. 
This technique was tested using two methods. The first test was to try logging into 
one of the workstations with an incorrect password. This generated the following 
event on the workstation as illustrated in Figure 56: 
 
Figure 56. T1110 - Brute Force 
 
The event ID 4625 is not generated for all authentication methods, such as 
connecting through LDAP. To demonstrate this, authentication was also tested to 
network share with incorrect credentials. This did not generate events on the 
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workstation, but generated Kerberos pre-authentication failed event in the domain 
controller as shown in Figure 57: 
 
Figure 57. T1110 - Brute Force 2 
 
To capture these events, Logstash filter was created (Appendix 17) that matches the 
events with ID 4625 and events with ID 4771 and failure code 0x18 (invalid 
password). Figure 58 verifies the technique information was added to the event. 
 
Figure 58. T1110 Kibana verification 
 
4.10 Discovery 
Discovery is a phase of the kill chain where the adversary is gathering information 
about the networks, systems, services, applications and users of the target 
environment. The adversary can then use the information to further their objective, 
such as access specific credentials or move laterally to new system. Native operating 
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system tools provide the functionality to accomplish most of the discovery 
techniques. 
4.10.1 T1087 - Account Discovery 
Account discovery techniques involve the adversary attempting to discover user 
accounts of the target system or accounts of the domain environment. Windows 
includes net.exe native tool that can be used to list local users (net user) and groups 
(net localgroup). Another tool called Dsquery can be used to query Active Directory 
for users and groups information. Dsquery is included in the Remote Server 
Administration Tools bundle. PowerShell includes Get-LocalUser, Get-AdUser, Get-
LocalGroup and Get-AdGroup cmdlets that list local and domain users. 
The execution of the tools mentioned above can be detected by monitoring the 
specific process command-line arguments. Figure 59 shows an example of listing 
users using net.exe tool and Figure 60 the resulting Sysmon ProcessCreate event. 
 
Figure 59. Listing users using net.exe 
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Figure 60. T1087 - Account Discovery 
 
To capture events generated by net and dsquery tools, Logstash filter was created 
(Appendix 18) that matches ProcessCreate events with the specific command line 
arguments used to list users or groups. Figure 61 verifies the technique information 
was added to the event. 
 
Figure 61. T1087 Kibana verification 
 
4.10.2 T1016 - System Network Configuration Discovery 
System Network Configuration Discovery is a technique where the adversary looks 
for details about the network configuration of the target system. Many native 
Windows tools exist for querying information about the network configuration, such 
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as ipconfig for IP, DNS and network adapter information, arp for displaying the ARP-
table content and route for displaying the routing table. PowerShell has cmdlets that 
display similar information, such as Get-NetAdapter, Get-NetIPAddress and Get-
NetRoute. (System Network Configuration Discovery n.d.) 
As with the previous technique, the tools used in this technique can be detected by 
monitoring the specific process command-line arguments. Figure 62 shows an 
example of displaying TCP/IP and DNS configuration for all network adapters. Figure 
63 displays the resulting Sysmon ProcessCreate event. 
 
Figure 62. Displaying network adapter information using ipconfig.exe 
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Figure 63. T1016 - System Network Configuration Discovery 
 
To capture events generated by ipconfig, route and arp tools Logstash filter was 
created (Appendix 19) that matches ProcessCreate events with the command line of 
the tools. Figure 64 verifies the technique information was added to the event. 
 
Figure 64. T1016 Kibana verification 
 
4.10.3 T1083 - File and Directory Discovery 
File and Directory Discovery tactic category involves the adversary searching files or 
directories from local system or network share. The goal is usually to access sensitive 
information or to conduct reconnaissance. Adversaries can utilize native Windows 
Cmd tools, for example dir or tree to enumerate the filesystem. PowerShell has the 
Get-Item and Get-ChildItem that can be used to browse and search the filesystem. 
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Some adversaries have also written custom tools that use the Windows API to gather 
file and directory information. (File and Directory Discovery n.d.) 
Because the Windows Cmd native functions or use of Windows API cannot be easily 
monitored, the implementation focuses on the PowerShell file and directory listing 
cmdlets Get-Item and Get-ChildItem. The execution of these cmdlets can be detected 
by monitoring PowerShell module logging. To test this, Get-Item cmdlet was 
executed (Figure 65) and the resulting module logging event observed (Figure 66). 
 
Figure 65. Listing directory files with Get-Item PowerShell cmdlet 
 
 
Figure 66. T1083 - File and Directory Discovery 
 
To match the events generated by execution of the Get-Item or Get-ChildItem 
modues, Logstash filter was created (Appendix 20) that matches events with ID 4103 
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and where the command name is either of the module names. Figure 67 verifies the 
technique information was added to the event. 
 
Figure 67. T1083 Kibana verification 
 
4.11 Lateral Movement 
An initial system that the adversary gains access to in the target environment is often 
not the ultimate system they are targeting. Reaching the ultimate target requires 
moving through multiple systems, a process that is called lateral movement. Lateral 
movement tactic category consists of techniques that enable the adversary to access 
and control remote systems over the network. Adversaries can take advantage of 
native remote access tools or install third party tools to accomplish lateral 
movement. (Lateral Movement n.d.) 
4.11.1 T1105 - Remote File Copy 
Adversaries may copy files, such as tools or malware from one host to another over 
the course of an operation. These files can be then used for remote execution to 
support lateral movement. Remote file copy can be accomplished using network 
shares (SMB) or file transfer protocols like FTP or SFTP. (Remote File Copy n.d.) 
Remote file copy can be detected by monitoring file creation and access to network 
shares on servers and workstations. Analyzing network traffic can also reveal unusual 
data flows between hosts or uncommon protocols being used. The implementation 
focuses on remote file copy over network shares, since it is more commonly used in 
Windows environment. (Remote File Copy n.d.) 
Windows file share access is recorded in event ID 5140 (A network share object was 
accessed). To enable logging of this event, Audit File Share audit policy was turned on 
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in the environment. A network share was also created on the domain controller. 
Figure 68 displays an event that was generated when the share was accessed.  
 
Figure 68. T1105 - Remote File Copy 
 
To capture these events, Logstash filter was created (Appendix 21) that matches 
events with ID 5140 and where the share is not one of the Windows internal 
management shares. Figure 69 verifies the technique information was added to the 
event. 
 
Figure 69. T1105 Kibana verification 
 
4.11.2 T1076 - Remote Desktop Protocol 
Remote desktop is an operating system feature that allows users to log into a system 
over a network and interact with the graphical user interface of the system remotely. 
The best known remote desktop solution is the Windows built-in remote desktop 
implementation called Remote Desktop Services (RDS); however, many third party 
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remote desktop tools also exist for various operating system platforms. (Remote 
Desktop Protocol n.d.) 
Adversaries with valid credentials can use remote desktop connections to easily 
move laterally between systems. Remote desktop connections can be detected by 
monitoring Windows Event Logs. Successful authentication using remote desktop 
connection is recorded in the event ID 2624 (An account was successfully logged on). 
The logon type 10 (RemoteInteractive) indicates that the user logged in using remote 
desktop connection. Figure 70 displays event that was generated when 
authentication was made to one of the workstations using remote desktop 
connection. 
 
Figure 70. T1076 - Remote Desktop Protocol 
 
To capture these events, Logstash filter was created (Appendix 22) that matches 
events with ID 4624 and where the logon type is 10. Figure 71 verifies the technique 
information was added to the event. 
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Figure 71. T1076 Kibana verification 
 
4.11.3 T1077 – Windows Admin Shares 
Windows has several hidden network shares that are used for administrative 
purposes. Common administrative shares include disk volumes (e.g. C$), IPC$ for 
inter process communication, ADMIN$ for remote administration, SYSVOL and 
NETLOGON for Windows domain administration. Because these shares are hidden, 
they are not visible in Windows Explorer. They can, however, be listed on command 
line using the “net use” command. Accessing admin shares requires administrative 
access on the system. (How to remove administrative shares in Windows Server 2008 
n.d.) 
Adversaries may use these shares to access remote systems over network. Some 
remote administration tools, such as PsExec, also use admin shares to function. 
PsExec is a tool included in the Windows Sysinternal suite which can be used to 
execute programs on remote systems. 
The use of this technique can be detected by monitoring the event ID 5140 (A 
network share object was accessed) and looking specifically for share names that 
match the common admin share names. This was verified by executing ipconfig 
remotely using PsExec as seen in Figure 72. Figure 73 displays one of the ID 5140 
events generated by PsExec transferring files to the remote system. 
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Figure 72. Executing PsExec 
 
 
Figure 73. T1077 - Windows Admin Shares 
 
To capture admin share related events, Logstash filter was created (Appendix 23) 
that matches events with ID 5140 and where the share name is one of the well-
known admin shares. Figure 74 verifies the technique information was added to the 
event. 
 
Figure 74. T1077 Kibana verification 
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4.12 Command and Control 
Command and control (C&C) is a tactic category where the adversary remotely 
controls systems they have compromised in the target environment. The servers 
used to control compromised machines usually reside outside of the victim network, 
on the Internet. Adversaries use various methods to hide their communication. 
Common network protocols, such as HTTP and DNS are often used for 
communication to mimic normal network traffic occurring in the environment. Data 
obfuscation and encryption techniques also make it harder to detect and analyze 
command and control traffic. (Command and Control n.d.) 
4.12.1 T1105 - Remote File Copy 
Adversaries may copy files from command and control servers to bring tools to the 
target environment (Remote File Copy n.d.). Remote file copy technique was covered 
in detail in section 4.11.1. 
4.12.2 T1071 -  Standard Application Layer Protocol 
Adversaries may use standard application layer protocols that are used in every IT 
environment to blend their command and control traffic within normal network 
communications. Common application layer protocols used for command and 
control include HTTP/HTTPS, SMTP, DNS and SMB. 
Command and control traffic can be detected by monitoring for unusual traffic flows 
based on NetFlow data or by looking at packet capture data for unexpected protocol 
behaviors or known control traffic signatures. Monitoring for unusual process 
network connections from client systems can also be effective in revealing C&C 
communication. 
To test this technique, Sysmon ability to log TCP/UDP network connections initiated 
by processes was utilized. C&C traffic was simulated by executing HTTP GET request 
to an external webserver using PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet as illustrated 
in Figure 75. Figure 76 displays the resulting Sysmon event. 
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Figure 75. Executing PowerShell Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet 
 
 
Figure 76. T1071 - Standard Application Layer Protocol 
 
To match network connections with standard application layer protocols, Logstash 
filter was created (Appendix 24) that matches events with ID 3 and where the 
protocol is one of the four commonly used C&C protocols: HTTP, HTTPS, DNS and 
SMTP. The filter only matches external (public) destination IP addresses. Figure 77 
verifies the technique information was added to the event. 
 
Figure 77. T1071 Kibana verification 
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4.12.3 T1043 - Commonly Used Port 
In addition to standard protocols, adversaries often use common TCP/UDP ports for 
communication to bypass firewalls or IDS/IPS systems. Commonly used ports include 
TCP 80 (HTTP), TCP 443 (HTTPS), TCP 25 (SMTP) and TCP/UDP 53 (DNS). Adversaries 
may use standard protocols with the ports or use completely different protocols. 
(Commonly Used Port n.d.) 
The same detection methods can be utilized for this technique as the T071. 
Advanced firewalls and IDS systems can also detect if the port number does not 
match the application layer protocol. 
This technique was tested by simulating C&C traffic, this time by creating SSH 
connection to external server and monitoring the generated Sysmon network 
connection events as demonstrated in Figure 78. 
 
Figure 78. T1043 - Commonly Used Port 
 
To capture events related to this technique, Logstash filter was created (Appendix 
25) that matches events with ID 3 and where the destination port is either 22 (SSH), 
123 (NTP) or 110 (POP3). Figure 79 verifies the technique information was added to 
the event. 
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Figure 79. T1043 Kibana verification 
 
5 Data analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The goal of the data analysis part of the thesis was to use the rules defined in the 
testing part to enrich events generated by a simulated intrusion kill chain, and apply 
data analysis to the event data in order to link phases of the intrusion together. 
Graph theory was a natural choice for analyzing connections between the events.  As 
explained in the Graph Theory chapter, a graph consists of vertices (nodes) and 
edges (links) that connect the vertices together. Looking at the event data, the 
events form vertices of a graph; however, determining the edges is a more complex 
issue. Each event consists of fields which contain information about the event, for 
example an event id or a computer name. Some of the fields contain information 
that identifies the entity that generated the event (e.g. username) or the host where 
it was generated (e.g. hostname or computer name). By looking at common values of 
these fields across the whole dataset, the otherwise unrelated events can be linked 
together. For example, an authentication event on one host might not seem related 
to a process execution event on another host; however, the events can be connected 
if both of them have the same username as illustrated in Figure 80. 
 
Figure 80. Event connection example 
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In order to form a coherent chain of intrusion phases, the events should be ordered 
to match the order in which they were executed during the intrusion. Directed graph 
where the edges have direction can be used to represent the order of events. 
Direction of an edge can be determined by comparing connected vertex (event) 
timestamps and setting the direction from an older to a newer event as illustrated in 
Figure 81. 
 
Figure 81. Directed event graph 
 
5.2 Intrusion simulation 
To generate data for the analysis, a simulated intrusion scenario including most 
phases of a typical intrusion kill chain was executed in the test environment. The 
simulation included the following steps: 
1. The user executes malicious exploit.vbs script on the workstation ws-w10-1 that 
opens Meterpreter session for the adversary. (Execution: T1064 – Scripting) 
2. The adversary uses the Meterpreter getsystem command to elevate privileges. 
(Privilege Escalation: T1050 – New Service) 
3. The adversary uses the Meterpreter migrate command to migrate to another 
process. (Defence Evasion: T1055 – Process Injection) 
4. The adversary uses PowerShell to execute in-memory Mimikatz to dump credentials 
from the operating system. (Credential Access: T1003 – Credential Dumping) 
5. The adversary executes commands to discover information about the networks and 
users of the environment. (Discovery: T1087 – Account Discovery, T1016 – System 
Network Configuration Discover, T1087 – Account Discovery) 
6. The adversary use PowerShell to download PSExec tool. (Execution: T1086 – 
PowerShell) 
7. The adversary uses PSExec to move laterally to the domain controller. (Lateral 
Movement: T1077 – Windows Admin Shares) 
8. The adversary deletes PSExec on the workstation ws-w10-1 to hide his tracks. 
(Defence Evasion: T1107 – File Deletion) 
5.3 Data analysis process 
A separate CentOS Linux host was set up for the data analysis purpose. The host 
included Jupyter Lab for illustration and visualization purposes, as well as libraries for 
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fetching the data from Elasticsearch, parsing the data and conducting the analysis 
and visualization. Complete code for the data analysis can be seen in Appendix 26. 
The data analysis process begins with fetching the data from Elasticsearch using the 
Python Elasticsearch Client. For performance reasons, the dataset was limited to only 
include events from the relevant time range and which are associated with a MITRE 
technique. Figure 82 shows an example of a partial document fetched from 
Elasticsearch. 
 
Figure 82. Elasticsearch document example 
 
Json_normalize function from pandas package was used to transform the JSON data 
from Elasticsearch into a flat table dataframe. Some field names and values were also 
normalized. 
The next step was to create edges for the graph. The method selected for this step 
was to merge pandas dataframe with itself on the column that will connect events 
together. The user_name column was used in this particular case. The merge 
operation results a dataframe with events that have the same user_name field value. 
In addition to the user_name field, the dataframe includes id, mitre_technique_id, 
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timestamp and computer_name fields for both connected events, with a _x and _y 
prefix. Figure 83 displays an example row from the dataframe. 
 
 
Figure 83. Merged dataframe example 
 
One issue with the resulting dataframe is that it includes unnecessary rows. Each 
event has a connection to itself and there are also two connections between distinct 
events, one for each direction. Removing the self-connections can be accomplished 
by filtering all rows where id_x and id_y have the same value. Filtering out the 
duplicate connections between distinct events was a more challenging issue. The 
way to solve the issue was to filter out the rows where timestamp_x is greater than 
timestamp_y or where both are equal. This left only a single connection between 
each of the connected event. The final filter applied was to remove connections with 
the same mitre_technique_id. 
After the nodes and edges have been defined, the graph itself can be formed using 
the NetworkX package. This process starts with creating a Graph object by using the 
from_pandas_edgelist function which creates a graph from pandas dataframe. The 
arguments given to the function specified that the graph should be directed graph 
and which fields indicate the source and target nodes. To limit the size of the graph, 
the NetworkX DiGraph dag_longest_path function was used to find the longest path, 
which represents the longest chain of connected events. The function returns a list of 
nodes, which were used to create a new directed graph that only included the 
longest path. 
The final part of the data analysis process was visualizing the results. The goal of the 
visualization was to give the user a view of the different techniques detected from 
the event data to aid determining if the activity is malicious or not. Another goal was 
to have an interactive visualization that would update based on the applied filters.  
Plotly Python library was chosen for the visualization because of its interactive nature 
and support for Jupyter Lab. 
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To make the different tactic categories and hosts stand out, different symbols for the 
tactics and colors for the hosts were assigned. Plotly figures consist of one or more 
traces that contain the data used to display content of the figure. Two traces are 
required to draw a graph, one that for the nodes and one for the edges. Traces 
contain dictionary of properties, such as x and y coordinates and symbol and color 
for each data point. The y coordinate of each node was set to a static value so that all 
the nodes would be placed on the same line horizontally. The x coordinates were 
based on timestamps of the events. One interactive feature of Plotly is the ability to 
display information about the data points by hovering over them. A hover text was 
defined that displays id, event id, event action, timestamp, computer name, MITRE 
technique id and MITRE tactic category field for each node of the graph. 
Plotly figure is created by defining a Figure object that includes data traces and 
layout configuration. Figure is displayed by calling the show method, as illustrated in 
the Figure 84. 
 
Figure 84. Plotly graph visualization 
 
The figure displays each node of the graph in a timeline. Each node represents an 
event that has a MITRE adversary technique associated with it. The Nodes are 
labeled by technique id. Additional information about events can be seen by 
hovering over a node as seen in Figure 85. 
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Figure 85. Plotly hovertext 
 
As can be seen in Figure 84, there is a cluster of nodes between timestamps 15:00 
and 18:00. By zooming in, a multiple different MITRE techniques (PowerShell, New 
Service, Windows Admin Shares…) executed across multiple tactic categories 
(Execution, Persistence, Lateral-Movement) can be seen on both ws-w10-1 (red) and 
dc (blue) hosts as illustrated in Figure 86. These events represent the actions from 
the intrusion simulation. 
 
Figure 86. Plotly figure zoomed 
 
The figure in its current form is static in a way that the user has no control over the 
data that is displayed. For example, the username that connects events together is 
hardcoded in the source code. Ipywidgets is a collection of interactive HTML widgets, 
which can be used to change input in JupyterLab. The widgets make it possible for 
users to change the data values and have the figure automatically update to reflect 
the change. 
A form was created using ipywidgets that included a select box for selecting 
username and checkboxes to filter which MITRE tactics should be included in the 
figure. Change of values in these widgets triggers function that reruns the data 
manipulation, graph and figure generation steps described previously with the 
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selected values. Figure 87 shows an example where the system user is selected and 
only execution tactic category techniques are included. 
 
Figure 87. Ipywidgets filter 
 
6 Conclusions 
The fight between adversaries and defenders is an arms race where adversaries are 
constantly developing new techniques to evade defenses and stay hidden, while 
defenders struggle with lack of visibility and growing complexity of IT environments. 
Finding traces of adversary activity from a vast amount of event data is difficult, 
however, not impossible if right approach is used. The behavior driven approach 
helps the defenders identify which events are indicators of a certain adversary 
behavior and map the events to the techniques and tactics. The events can be 
further correlated together to form a chain of events, which is a strong indicator of 
compromise compared to inspecting events in isolation. 
Building a system for detecting intrusions does not require huge amount of resources 
or buying expensive security solutions. The MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base provides 
an easy starting point with a plethora of actionable information that security teams 
can use to measure their current defenses and develop new methods of detecting 
adversary behavior. The free and open-source software ecosystem has also evolved 
rapidly over the last few years. Tools such as the ELK or HELK stack provide a 
platform which competes with many commercial SIEM solutions in terms of features 
and ease of use. The data analysis tools have also advanced so that there is no longer 
need for massive compute resources or professional data analysts to get value out of 
them. 
The research question that the thesis aimed to answer was whether it is possible to 
identify and link the stages of cyber kill chain by collecting and analyzing event data. 
The implementation and data analysis sections demonstrate that this is indeed 
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possible. However, some requirements have to be taken into consideration in order 
to get reliable results. The first requirement is to have knowledge on how the 
adversary techniques work and how they can be detected. This information is well 
documented in knowledge bases such as the MITRE ATT&CK. An issue that often 
arises is how to distinguish legitimate behavior from the adversary behavior, since 
many of the adversary techniques resemble normal every day activity happening in 
every IT environment. Solving this issue requires not only knowing which events a 
certain technique generates, but the context it occurs. For example, use of PsExec 
remote management tool may be common in one organization for administrative 
purposes but raise alarm in other. Another example could be that user login events 
are common during the daytime but a login event during the night could be 
considered suspicious. The reliability of adversary technique detection can be 
increased if an organization adjusts their detection rules according to the context of 
their IT environment instead of relying on static predefined rules. 
The main challenge with connecting events and the associated techniques together is 
determining which field or fields to use as the connection. Events rarely contain 
fields which explicitly map an event to another. Instead, we have to rely on common 
fields across different types of events, such as usernames or IP addresses. Problem is 
that two events containing the same username may or may not be connected 
depending on the event types and the context that they occur. Another problem is 
that all events may not contain these common fields, which can lead to gaps in 
detection coverage. The most reliable approach to connecting events would be to 
use multiple fields for the connections and filter the events based on context, such as 
specific time range in which the events occur. 
The overall conclusion from the implementation was that while the concept of 
identifying cyber kill chain seemed straightforward, implementing a solution which 
produces real benefits can be challenging. The open source tools provide a great 
starting point; however, building an easy to operate and reliable solution requires 
skills and knowledge of the environment to which the solution is deployed. 
87 
 
 
7 Deliberation and futher research 
The research approach chosen for the thesis makes the reliability evaluation of the 
results difficult. As mentioned in chapter 2.3, the research was conducted using 
observation method.  An issue from the reliability standpoint is that the observation 
was only done by the researcher, which produces subjective results. The researcher 
will base the observations on their own perspective and experience, which may not 
correspond to objective truth. The researcher will always interpret the world from 
his or her own frame of reference (Kananen 2015b, 339). Having outside individuals 
use the system developed during the implementation in a more realistic scenario, 
such as cyber exercise and surveying them afterwards would have produced more 
objective results that could be compared to the author’s own observations. The 
complications causing the implementation to take longer than expected and 
schedules of upcoming cyber exercises did not, however, make conducting such a 
survey feasible. Implementing the system in an exercise environment, creating the 
survey and analyzing the results would have delayed the completion of the thesis 
significantly. 
The data analysis part of the thesis turned out to be more complicated than 
expected. The main issue was related to the heterogeneous nature of the event data. 
Even though the event data was collected from a single platform (Windows), many 
event types still contain a different set of fields. This caused some adversary 
techniques not to be included in the chain of events when the event did not include 
the user_name field, even though the event was part of the simulated intrusion kill 
chain. The author’s lack of experience with data analysis methods and tools also 
slowed down the process. 
The thesis produced a proof of concept implementation on how an intrusion kill 
chain could be detected and visualized. More research and development is required 
to make the implementation suitable for use in real environments. Identifying and 
mapping the events to techniques can be expanded by adding more data points and 
making the rules more granular. This would improve accuracy and reduce the 
number of false positives. The data analysis part of the thesis used only a single field 
for connecting the events together; however, the ability to connect the events 
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through multiple fields would make the connections between the events stronger, 
e.g. two events connected through username versus both username and IP address. 
Using multiple connected field would also help with cases where all events do not 
contain the same set of fields. For example, an event might not contain a username 
field but includes a source IP field which connects it to other events. Another 
interesting further research topic would be to test if different graph types, such as 
weighted graph, could be used to improve the accuracy of the results. It would also 
be interesting to compare the length of the event chains against historical data in 
order to detect anomalies. 
Visualization of the intrusion kill chain is important in order to detect patterns or 
anomalies and to be able to drill down into details. The visualization used in the 
thesis displays a simple graph with basic interactivity features, which could be 
improved in many ways. Scaling of the graph could be improved so that the 
individual events can be better distinguished when many events exist within a small 
time frame. A better ability to filter and focus on specific parts of the graph would 
also help users to get a better understanding of the chain of events. Enhancing 
interactivity of the graph in general, such as highlighting interesting nodes and edges 
or attaching more information to them would be an interesting further development 
topic. 
The author feels that the thesis reached the goal of producing a model and a proof of 
concept implementation for detecting and mapping adversary techniques into cyber 
kill chain. The thesis provides a good starting point for further research into the topic 
as well as for more practical implementations. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. top_10_groups_by_techniques.py 
 
#!/usr/bin/env python3 
 
from attackcti import attack_client 
from stix2 import TAXIICollectionSource, Filter, CompositeDataSource 
from taxii2client.v20 import Collection 
 
from pandas import * 
from pandas.io.json import json_normalize 
 
lift = attack_client() 
 
ATTCK_STIX_COLLECTIONS = "https://cti-taxii.mitre.org/stix/collections/" 
ENTERPRISE_ATTCK = "95ecc380-afe9-11e4-9b6c-751b66dd541e" 
 
ENTERPRISE_COLLECTION = Collection(ATTCK_STIX_COLLECTIONS + ENTERPRISE_ATTCK + "/") 
TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE = TAXIICollectionSource(ENTERPRISE_COLLECTION) 
 
pandas.set_option('display.max_rows', 200) 
 
techniques = { 
    'group': [], 
    'techniques': [] 
} 
 
filter_relationship_objects = [ 
    Filter('type', '=', 'relationship'), 
    Filter('relationship_type', '=', 'uses'), 
] 
 
all_relationships = TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_relationship_objects) 
 
filter_technique_objects = [ 
    Filter('type', '=', 'attack-pattern'), 
    Filter('x_mitre_platforms', '=', 'Windows'), 
] 
 
all_techniques = TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_technique_objects) 
 
filter_group_objects = [ 
    Filter('type', '=', 'intrusion-set'), 
] 
 
all_group_objects = TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_group_objects) 
 
for group in all_group_objects: 
 
    group_techniques = [] 
    group_relationships = list(filter(lambda x: x.source_ref == group.id, all_relationships)) 
 
    for relationship in group_relationships: 
        group_techniques.extend(list(filter(lambda x: x.id == relationship.target_ref, all_techniques))) 
95 
 
 
 
    group_techniques = lift.translate_stix_objects(group_techniques) 
 
    techniques['group'].append(group.name) 
    techniques['techniques'].append(len(group_techniques)) 
 
techniques = pandas.DataFrame(techniques) 
techniques = techniques.sort_values('techniques',ascending=False).head(10) 
print(techniques) 
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Appendix 2. top_3_techniques_by_tactic.py 
 
#!/usr/bin/env python3 
 
from attackcti import attack_client 
from stix2 import TAXIICollectionSource, Filter, CompositeDataSource 
from taxii2client.v20 import Collection 
 
from pandas import * 
from pandas import json_normalize 
 
lift = attack_client() 
 
ATTCK_STIX_COLLECTIONS = "https://cti-taxii.mitre.org/stix/collections/" 
ENTERPRISE_ATTCK = "95ecc380-afe9-11e4-9b6c-751b66dd541e" 
 
ENTERPRISE_COLLECTION = Collection(ATTCK_STIX_COLLECTIONS + ENTERPRISE_ATTCK + "/") 
TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE = TAXIICollectionSource(ENTERPRISE_COLLECTION) 
 
pandas.set_option('display.max_rows', 200) 
 
techniques = [] 
groups = ['APT32', 
          'Lazarus Group', 
          'APT28', 
          'APT3', 
          'OilRig', 
          'Dragonfly 2.0', 
          'Threat Group-3390', 
          'Patchwork', 
          'menuPass', 
          'BRONZE BUTLER' 
] 
tactics = ['discovery', 
           'lateral-movement', 
           'execution', 
           'persistence', 
           'defense-evasion', 
           'command-and-control', 
           'privilege-escalation', 
           'credential-access' 
] 
 
 
filter_relationship_objects = [ 
    Filter('type', '=', 'relationship'), 
    Filter('relationship_type', '=', 'uses') 
] 
 
all_relationships = TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_relationship_objects) 
 
filter_technique_objects = [ 
    Filter('type', '=', 'attack-pattern'), 
    Filter('x_mitre_platforms', '=', 'Windows') 
] 
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all_techniques = TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_technique_objects) 
 
filter_group_objects = [ 
    Filter('type', '=', 'intrusion-set'), 
] 
 
all_group_objects = TC_ENTERPRISE_SOURCE.query(filter_group_objects) 
 
def filter_tactics(technique): 
    new_tactics = [] 
    for tactic in technique['tactic']: 
        if tactic in tactics: 
            new_tactics.append(tactic) 
    technique['tactic'] = new_tactics 
    return technique['tactic'] 
 
 
for group in groups: 
    group_object = list(filter(lambda x: x.name == group, all_group_objects))[0] 
 
    group_techniques = [] 
    group_relationships = list(filter(lambda x: x.source_ref == group_object.id, all_relationships)) 
 
    for relationship in group_relationships: 
        group_techniques.extend(list(filter(lambda x: x.id == relationship.target_ref, all_techniques))) 
 
    group_techniques = lift.translate_stix_objects(group_techniques) 
    group_techniques = list(filter(filter_tactics, group_techniques)) 
    techniques.extend(group_techniques) 
 
techniques = json_normalize(techniques) 
 
s = techniques.apply(lambda x: pandas.Series(x['tactic']),axis=1).stack().reset_index(level=1, 
drop=True) 
s.name = 'tactic' 
techniques = techniques.drop('tactic', axis=1).join(s).reset_index(drop=True) 
techniques = techniques.reindex(['tactic','technique','technique_id'], axis=1) 
 
techniques = 
techniques.groupby(['tactic','technique'])['technique'].count().to_frame(name='technique_count') 
g = techniques['technique_count'].groupby(level=0, group_keys=False) 
techniques = g.apply(lambda x: 
x.sort_values(ascending=False).head(3)).to_frame(name='technique_count') 
print(techniques) 
 
  
98 
 
 
Appendix 3. Observation diary 
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Appendix 4. Technique, tactic & event ID matrix 
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Appendix 5. Winlogbeat configuration 
 
# Winlogbeat 6, 7, and 8 are currently supported! 
# You can download the latest stable version of winlogbeat here: 
# https://www.elastic.co/downloads/beats/winlogbeat 
 
# For simplicity/brevity we have only included only the enabled options necessary for sending 
windows logs to HELK. 
# Please visit the Elastic documentation for the complete details of each option and full reference 
config: 
# https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/winlogbeat/current/winlogbeat-reference-yml.html 
 
#======================= Winlogbeat specific options ========================== 
winlogbeat.event_logs: 
  - name: Application 
    ignore_older: 30m 
  - name: Security 
    ignore_older: 30m 
  - name: System 
    ignore_older: 30m 
  - name: Microsoft-windows-sysmon/operational 
    ignore_older: 30m 
  - name: Microsoft-windows-PowerShell/Operational 
    ignore_older: 30m 
    event_id: 4103, 4104 
  - name: Windows PowerShell 
    event_id: 400,600 
    ignore_older: 30m 
  - name: Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational 
    event_id: 5857,5858,5859,5860,5861 
 
#----------------------------- Kafka output -------------------------------- 
output.kafka: 
  # initial brokers for reading cluster metadata 
  # Place your HELK IP(s) here (keep the port). 
  # If you only have one Kafka instance (default for HELK) then remove the 2nd IP that has port 9093 
  hosts: ["<HELK-IP>:9092","<HELK-IP>:9093"] 
  topic: "winlogbeat" 
  ############################# HELK Optimizing Latency ###################### 
  max_retries: 2 
  max_message_bytes: 1000000 
 
Appendix 6. Technique T1059 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [process_name] == "cmd.exe" or [process_parent_name] == "cmd.exe" { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
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      query => "technique_id:T1059" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 7. Technique T1064 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [process_name] in ["cscript.exe","wscript.exe"] or [process_command_line] =~ 
"\.(bat|cmd|hta|jse|ps1|sct|vbs|vbe|wsf)" { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1064" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 8. Technique T1086 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [event_id] in [4103,4104] { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1086" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 9. Technique T1053 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
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  if [event_id] in [4698,4702] { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1053" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 10. Technique T1060 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [event_id] == 13 and [registry_key_path] =~ "\\CurrentVersion\\Run" { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1060" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
 
  if [event_id] == 11 and [file_name] =~ "\\startup" { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1060" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 11. Technique T1078 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [event_id] == 4720 { 
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    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1078" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
  if [event_id] == 4672 and [user_name] != 'system' { 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1078" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 12. Technique T1050 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [event_id] == 4697 and [service_account_name] == 'LocalSystem' { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1050" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
  if [event_id] == 7045 and [service_account_name] == 'localsystem' { 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1050" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
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Appendix 13. Technique T1107 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [powershell][command][name] == 'Remove-Item' and [event_id] == 4103 { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1107" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 14. Technique T1027 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [powershell][host][application] =~ "\-[Ee^]{1,2}[NnCcOoDdEeMmAa^]+ [A-Za-z0-9+/=]{5,}" and 
[event_id] == 4103 { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1027" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 15. Technique T1003 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [event_id] == 7 and [module_loaded] =~ "(WinSCard|cryptdll|hid|samlib|vaultcli)\.dll" { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1003" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
105 
 
 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 16. Technique T1056 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [event_id] == 12 and [event_type] == "CreateKey" and [registry_key_path] =~ 
"\\Authentication\\Credential Providers" { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1056" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 17. Techinque T1110 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [event_id] == 4625 or ( [event_id] == 4771 and [event_status] == "0x18" ) { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1110" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 18. Technique T1087 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [event_id] == 1 and [process_command_line] =~ 
"(net\s+user)|(net\s+localgroup)|(dsquery\s+user)|(dsquery\s+group)" { 
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    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1087" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 19. Technique T1016 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [event_id] == 1 and [process_command_line] =~ "ipconfig|route|arp" { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1016" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 20. Technique T1083 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [event_id] == 4103 and [powershell][command][name] in ['Get-Item','Get-ChildItem'] { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1083" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 21. Technique T1105 Logstash filter 
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filter { 
 
  if [event_id] == 5140 and [share_name] !~ "ipc\$|sysvol" { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1105" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 22. Technique T1076 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [event_id] == 4624 and [logon_type] == "10" { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1076" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 23. Technique T1077 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [event_id] == 5140 and [share_name] =~ "c\$|ipc\$|admin\$" { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1077" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
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Appendix 24. Technique T1071 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [event_id] == 3 and [dst_port_name] in ["http","https","dns","smtp"] and [dst_ip_public] { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1071" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 25. Technique T1043 Logstash filter 
 
filter { 
 
  if [event_id] == 3 and [dst_port] in [22,123,110] { 
 
    elasticsearch { 
      hosts => ["helk-elasticsearch:9200"] 
      index => "mitre-attack-*" 
      query => "technique_id:T1043" 
      sort => "modified:desc" 
      fields => { "tactic" => "mitre_tactic" 
                  "technique" => "mitre_technique" 
                  "technique_id" => "mitre_technique_id" 
                } 
    } 
  } 
} 
Appendix 26. Data analysis code 
 
# Import packages  
 
from elasticsearch import Elasticsearch, helpers 
from pandas import json_normalize 
import networkx as nx 
import ipywidgets as widgets 
from IPython.display import display 
import plotly.graph_objects as go 
 
# Fetch data from Elasticsearch 
 
es = Elasticsearch(['http://172.16.100.50:9200'],timeout=600) 
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match_all = { 
    "size": 10000, 
    "query": { 
        "bool": { 
            "must": [ 
                { 
                    "exists": { 
                        "field": "mitre_technique_id" 
                    } 
                }, 
                { 
                  "range": { 
                    "@timestamp": { 
                      "format": "strict_date_optional_time", 
                      "gte": "2020-02-16T22:00:00.000Z", 
                      "lte": "2020-02-17T22:00:00.000Z" 
                    } 
                  } 
                } 
            ], 
            "filter": [ 
                { 
                  "match_all": {} 
                } 
            ], 
            "should": [], 
            "must_not": [ 
                { 
                  "match_phrase": { 
                    "meta_user_name_is_machine": { 
                      "query": "true" 
                    } 
                  } 
                } 
            ] 
        } 
    } 
} 
 
res = helpers.scan( 
    client = es, 
    scroll = '2m', 
    query = match_all,  
    index = "logs-endpoint*") 
 
doc_count = 0 
docs = [] 
 
for doc in res: 
    data = doc['_source'] 
    data['_id'] = doc['_id'] 
    docs.append(doc['_source']) 
     
print("DOC COUNT: %s" % len(docs)) 
 
# Craete pandas dataframe and normalize fields 
 
df = json_normalize(docs) 
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df.rename(columns={'_id': 'id', '@timestamp': 'timestamp'},inplace=True) 
df['user_name'] = df['user_name'].str.lower() 
 
# Function to generate the graph and visualization 
 
def create_graph(df, filters): 
     
    # Define id and edge columns 
    column_ID = 'id' 
    column_edge = 'user_name' 
    columns = ['mitre_technique_id', 'timestamp', 'winlog.computer_name'] 
 
    # Filter dataset based on values of the ipywidgets form 
    user_cond = df['user_name'] == filters['user_select'] 
    tactics = [ k for k,v in filters.items() if (v == True and k != 'user_select')] 
    tactic_cond = df['mitre_tactic'].apply(lambda x: list(set(x) & set(tactics))) 
    df_filtered = df[user_cond & tactic_cond] 
     
    # Remove duplicates and merge dataset to itself 
    data_to_merge = df_filtered[[column_ID, column_edge, 
*columns]].dropna(subset=[column_edge]).drop_duplicates() 
    data_to_merge = data_to_merge.merge(data_to_merge[[column_ID, column_edge, *columns]], 
on=column_edge) 
     
    # Get remove self connections 
    df_merged = 
data_to_merge[~(data_to_merge[column_ID+"_x"]==data_to_merge[column_ID+"_y"])].reset_index(
drop=True) 
     
    # Remove bidirectional connection 
    df_merged.drop(df_merged.loc[(df_merged["timestamp_x"]>df_merged["timestamp_y"]) | 
(df_merged["timestamp_x"]==df_merged["timestamp_y"])].index.tolist(), inplace=True) 
     
    # Remove connections with same technique id 
    
df_merged.drop(df_merged.loc[df_merged["mitre_technique_id_x"]==df_merged["mitre_technique_
id_y"]].index.tolist(), inplace=True) 
    df_merged.reset_index().drop(columns=['index']) 
     
    # Create NetworkX directed Graph object and add node attributes (fields) 
    G = nx.from_pandas_edgelist(df=df_merged, source=column_ID+"_x", target=column_ID+"_y", 
edge_attr=True, create_using=nx.DiGraph) 
    nx.set_node_attributes(G, df_filtered.set_index('id').to_dict('index')) 
     
    # Find the lognest path 
    longestPath = nx.algorithms.dag.dag_longest_path(G) 
     
    # Create new Graph object with only the nodes from the longest path 
    graph=nx.DiGraph() 
    nx.add_path(graph,longestPath) 
     
    # Set node and edge attributes to the new Graph 
    nx.set_node_attributes(graph,{n: d for n,d in G.nodes(data=True)}) 
    nx.set_edge_attributes(graph, {(e[0],e[1]): e[2] for e in G.edges(data=True)}) 
# (Re)Create graph and visualization when for the ipywidgets controls are changes 
def controlls(**filters): 
    create_graph(df, filters) 
 
# Create ipywidgets form to filter the visualization 
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defaut_user = 'administrator' 
 
users = df['user_name'].dropna().unique() 
 
tactics = ['execution', 'persistence', 'privilege-escalation', 'defence-evasion', 'credential-access', 
'discovery', 'lateral-movement', 'collection', 'command-and-control'] 
 
w = {} 
 
w['user_select'] = widgets.Dropdown( 
        options=tuple(users), 
        value=defaut_user, 
        description='User', 
        disabled=False, 
        layout={ 'margin': "0px 10px 0px 0px"} 
) 
 
for t in tactics: 
    w[t] = widgets.Checkbox( 
            value=True, 
            description=t, 
            disabled=False, 
            indent=False, 
            layout={ 'width': 'max-content', 'margin': "0px 10px 0px 0px"} 
        ) 
 
wi = widgets.HBox(tuple(w.values())) 
display(wi) 
widgets.interactive_output(controlls, w) 
